Zevachim Daf 114 (זבחים דף קי״ד)

📖 Breakdown

Amud Aleph (114a)

Segment 1

TYPE: גמרא

Resolution: How do animals involved in bestiality or set aside for idolatry become disqualified after consecration?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

בִּשְׁלָמָא רוֹבֵעַ וְנִרְבָּע – מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּאַקְדְּשִׁינְהוּ מֵעִיקָּרָא, וַהֲדַר אִירְבַעוּ.

English Translation:

Granted, with regard to an animal that actively copulated with a person or an animal that was the object of bestiality, you find circumstances in which the exemption for one who slaughters it outside the Temple courtyard cannot be based on the fact that it is not fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, e.g., a case where one initially consecrated it, and then engaged in bestiality with it.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara is resolving a difficulty from the previous daf. The mishna listed various disqualified animals that, if slaughtered outside the Temple, do not incur karet. The question was: why do we need a special verse to exclude them — aren’t they already unfit? The answer: we can find cases where the animal WAS initially fit (consecrated first), then later disqualified. For bestiality, this is straightforward — one can consecrate an animal and then sin with it.

Key Terms:

• רוֹבֵעַ (rove’a) = An animal that actively copulated with a human
• נִרְבָּע (nirba) = An animal that was the passive object of bestiality

Segment 2

TYPE: גמרא

Problem: How can an animal be “set aside” for idolatry after consecration?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אֶלָּא מוּקְצֶה וְנֶעֱבָד – אֵין אָדָם אוֹסֵר דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ! בְּקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי – דְּאָמַר: קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים מָמוֹן בְּעָלִים הוּא.

English Translation:

But with regard to an animal that was set aside for idol worship or one that was worshipped, this explanation is not tenable, since an animal that was already consecrated would not become disqualified because a person does not render forbidden an item that is not his. The Gemara responds that it is possible to disqualify a consecrated item in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity, and in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says: An offering of lesser sanctity is the property of the owner.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara raises a difficulty: once an animal is consecrated, it belongs to God — so how can someone designate it for idolatry? A person cannot forbid what isn’t theirs! The resolution: we’re dealing with קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים (offerings of lesser sanctity, like peace offerings), which according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili remain the property of the owner. Thus the owner CAN cause his peace offering to become disqualified by designating it for idol worship.

Key Terms:

• מוּקְצֶה (muktzeh) = Set aside — an animal designated for idol worship
• נֶעֱבָד (ne’evad) = Worshipped — an animal actually worshipped as an idol
• קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים (kodashim kalim) = Offerings of lesser sanctity (peace offerings, thanks offerings)

Segment 3

TYPE: ברייתא

Proof that lesser sanctity offerings belong to the owner

Hebrew/Aramaic:

דְּתַנְיָא: ״וּמָעֲלָה מַעַל בַּה׳״ – לְרַבּוֹת קֳדָשִׁים קַלִּים, שֶׁהֵן מָמוֹנוֹ. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי.

English Translation:

This is as it is taught in a baraita that the verse states with regard to the obligation to bring a guilt offering for robbery for taking a false oath concerning unlawful possession of the property of another: “If anyone sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord” (Leviticus 5:21). The term “against the Lord” serves to include one who takes an oath with regard to another’s offerings of lesser sanctity, since they are the property of their owner. This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

קלאוד על הדף:

The baraita proves Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s position from Leviticus 5:21. The verse discusses someone who swears falsely about possessing another’s property. The phrase “against the Lord” is extra — it comes to include even someone who falsely denies possessing another’s lesser sanctity offerings. This only makes sense if those offerings are considered the owner’s property, not God’s.

Key Terms:

• מַעַל (ma’al) = Trespass/misappropriation — usually against sacred property
• אָשָׁם גְּזֵלוֹת (asham gezeilot) = Guilt offering for robbery — brought for false oaths about property

Segment 4

TYPE: גמרא (סיכום)

Summary: How each category of disqualified animal can occur after consecration

Hebrew/Aramaic:

הִלְכָּךְ, רוֹבֵעַ וְנִרְבָּע – דְּבַר עֶרְוָה. מוּקְצֶה וְנֶעֱבָד – עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, בְּקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים.

English Translation:

Therefore, an animal that actively copulated with a person and an animal that was the object of bestiality are disqualified after having been consecrated, due to a matter of forbidden sexual intercourse. An animal that was set aside for idol worship or one that was worshipped as an object of idol worship becomes forbidden after it was consecrated in the case of an offering of lesser sanctity.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara now summarizes the resolution. Each category on the mishna’s list represents a case where the animal WAS initially fit to be sacrificed (it was consecrated), but later became disqualified. Bestiality disqualifies regardless of ownership. Idol worship designation works only for lesser sanctity offerings that remain the owner’s property.

Segment 5

TYPE: גמרא

How do payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog apply to consecrated animals?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אֶתְנַן, וּמְחִיר, כִּלְאַיִם, יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן – בִּוְלָדוֹת קָדָשִׁים. קָסָבַר: וַלְדֵי קָדָשִׁים – בַּהֲוָיָיתָן הֵן קְדוֹשִׁים.

English Translation:

In the case of an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, or an animal born of a mixture of diverse kinds, or an animal born by caesarean section — the mishna is referring to the offspring of sacrificial animals. The tanna holds that with regard to the offspring of sacrificial animals, they are sanctified only as they are from the time of birth, but not in utero.

קלאוד על הדף:

More categories need explanation: how can an animal already consecrated become disqualified as prostitute’s payment or a dog’s price? The answer: we’re discussing offspring of consecrated animals. While in utero, the fetus is part of a sacred animal. But the tanna holds offspring aren’t fully sacred until birth. So during pregnancy, if the mother (a lesser sanctity offering) was given as payment, the born offspring inherits that disqualification.

Key Terms:

• אֶתְנָן (etnan) = Payment to a prostitute — animals given as such are forbidden for sacrifice
• מְחִיר (mechir) = Price of a dog — animals exchanged for dogs are forbidden
• כִּלְאַיִם (kil’ayim) = Diverse kinds — hybrid offspring
• יוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן (yotzei dofen) = Born by caesarean section

Segment 6

TYPE: גמרא

Why does the tanna hold offspring are only sacred from birth?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

קָסָבַר: וַלְדֵי קָדָשִׁים – בַּהֲוָיָיתָן הֵן קְדוֹשִׁים.

English Translation:

The tanna holds that with regard to the offspring of sacrificial animals, they are sanctified only as they are from the time of birth.

קלאוד על הדף:

This explains the mechanism: the sanctity of offspring of sacrificial animals only takes effect at birth, not during gestation. This is a disputed halachic principle. According to this view, while still in utero, the fetus can be affected by factors (like being given as prostitute’s payment) that wouldn’t affect a fully sanctified animal. At birth, it emerges both sacred (inheriting mother’s status) and disqualified (by the payment transaction).

Segment 7

TYPE: גמרא

Why does the mishna need all three cases — blemished animals, underage doves, and “itself and its offspring”?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין וְכוּ׳, אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ וְכוּ׳. וּצְרִיכִי; דְּאִי תְּנָא בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין – מִשּׁוּם דִּמְאִיסִי; אֲבָל תּוֹרִין, דְּלָא מְאִיסִי – אֵימָא לָא, דְּמוֹדוּ לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן.

English Translation:

The mishna cites a disagreement between the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon with regard to temporarily blemished animals. The Gemara comments: And all of these cases are necessary. As, if the mishna had taught the disagreement only in the case of temporarily blemished animals, one would think that the Rabbis deem exempt one who sacrifices outside the Temple courtyard only in that case, because they are repulsive; but with regard to doves whose time of fitness has not yet arrived, which are not repulsive, I will say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Shimon.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara explains why the mishna needed to list Rabbi Shimon’s dispute with the Rabbis in three separate cases (temporarily blemished animals, underage doves, and “itself and its offspring”). Each case teaches something the others couldn’t. If we only had blemished animals, we might think the Rabbis only exempt because such animals are repulsive — but doves are fine, just young!

Key Terms:

• בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין (ba’alei mumin) = Blemished animals — temporarily disqualified
• תּוֹרִין (torin) = Doves — birds used for offerings
• מְאִיסִי (me’isi) = Repulsive — aesthetically unfit

Segment 8

TYPE: גמרא

Why we also need the case of doves

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְאִי תְּנָא תּוֹרִין – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא אִיחֲזוֹ וְאִידְּחוֹ; אֲבָל בַּעֲלֵי מוּמִין, דְּאִיחֲזוֹ וְאִידְּחוֹ – אֵימָא לָא, דְּמוֹדֵה לְהוּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לְרַבָּנַן.

English Translation:

And if the mishna had taught the disagreement only in the case of doves whose time of fitness has not yet arrived, one could say that it is only in this case that Rabbi Shimon holds that one who sacrifices them outside violates a prohibition, because they are not defined as: Fit for sacrifice and rejected. But with regard to temporarily blemished animals, which were fit for sacrifice and then disqualified, I will say that Rabbi Shimon concedes to the Rabbis.

קלאוד על הדף:

Conversely, if we only had the case of underage doves, we might think Rabbi Shimon only imposes a prohibition there because doves were never fit (just too young). But temporarily blemished animals WERE fit and then became unfit — maybe Rabbi Shimon would agree they’re exempt? Therefore we need both cases.

Key Terms:

• אִיחֲזוֹ וְאִידְּחוֹ (ichazu ve-idchu) = Fit and rejected — the animal was once acceptable then became disqualified

Segment 9

TYPE: גמרא

Why we also need the case of “itself and its offspring”

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְאִי תְּנָא הָנֵי תַּרְתֵּי – מִשּׁוּם דִּפְסוּלָא דְּגוּפַיְיהוּ; אֲבָל אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ, דִּפְסוּלָא מֵעָלְמָא קָאָתֵי לַהּ – אֵימָא מוֹדוּ לֵיהּ רַבָּנַן לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן; צְרִיכָא.

English Translation:

And if the mishna had taught only these two cases, i.e., temporarily blemished animals and doves whose time of fitness has not yet arrived, I would say that the Rabbis hold that one who slaughters them outside the Temple courtyard is not liable because their disqualification is inherent. But in the case of the animal itself and its offspring, where the disqualification comes to the offspring from an external factor, I will say that the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Shimon. Therefore, it is necessary for the mishna to teach the disagreement in each case.

קלאוד על הדף:

The final distinction: the first two cases involve inherent disqualifications (the animal itself is blemished or the dove itself is underage). But “itself and its offspring” is different — the second animal is perfectly fine; it’s only disqualified because its parent was slaughtered earlier that day. This is an external, temporary disqualification. Maybe the Rabbis would agree there’s a prohibition? Thus all three cases are necessary.

Key Terms:

• פְסוּלָא דְּגוּפַיְיהוּ (pesulah de-gufaihu) = Inherent disqualification — from the animal itself
• פְסוּלָא מֵעָלְמָא (pesulah me-alma) = External disqualification — from outside circumstances
• אוֹתוֹ וְאֶת בְּנוֹ (oto ve-et beno) = Itself and its offspring — prohibition against slaughtering both on same day

Segment 10

TYPE: גמרא

Question: What is Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

שֶׁהָיָה רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן?

English Translation:

The mishna teaches that Rabbi Shimon says: In the case of any sacrificial animal that is fit to be sacrificed after the passage of time, if one sacrificed it outside the courtyard, he is in violation of a prohibition but there is no liability for karet. Rabbi Shimon did not specify what prohibition is violated. The Gemara therefore asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon?

קלאוד על הדף:

Having established that the mishna needed all three cases, the Gemara now investigates: what is Rabbi Shimon’s source? He says that sacrificing an animal that will eventually become fit (like a temporarily blemished animal or underage dove) outside the Temple violates a prohibition but doesn’t incur karet. Where does this prohibition come from?

Segment 11

TYPE: גמרא

Reish Lakish’s answer: The prohibition comes from Deuteronomy 12:8

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעָא אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר אֲנַחְנוּ עוֹשִׂים פֹּה הַיּוֹם״ – אֲמַר לְהוּ מֹשֶׁה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל: כִּי עָיְילִיתוּ לָאָרֶץ – יְשָׁרוֹת תַּקְרִיבוּ, חוֹבוֹת לֹא תַּקְרִיבוּ.

English Translation:

Rabbi Ile’a says that Reish Lakish says that the verse states: “You shall not do all that we do here this day, every man whatsoever is right in his own eyes” (Deuteronomy 12:8–9). Moses said the following to the Jewish people: When you enter Eretz Yisrael, upright offerings (vow offerings and gift offerings) you may sacrifice, but obligatory offerings you may not sacrifice, even in the Tabernacle in Gilgal, until you arrive at “the rest,” i.e., Shiloh.

קלאוד על הדף:

Reish Lakish provides the scriptural source. Deuteronomy 12:8 prohibited certain offerings during the Gilgal period — before Shiloh was established. Moses told Israel: in Gilgal, you can bring voluntary offerings but not obligatory ones. The obligatory offerings’ “time had not yet come” — similar to our cases. The prohibition “לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן” (you shall not do) is the source for Rabbi Shimon’s rule.

Key Terms:

• יְשָׁרוֹת (yesharot) = Upright/voluntary offerings — vows and gifts
• חוֹבוֹת (chovot) = Obligatory offerings — mandatory sacrifices
• גִּלְגָּל (Gilgal) = First location of Tabernacle in Israel (before Shiloh)
• שִׁילֹה (Shiloh) = Location of Tabernacle for 369 years

Segment 12

TYPE: גמרא

Explanation: Gilgal to Shiloh as a paradigm for “lacking time”

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְגִלְגָּל לְגַבֵּי שִׁילֹה מְחוּסַּר זְמַן הוּא, וְקָאָמַר לְהוּ מֹשֶׁה: ״לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן״.

English Translation:

And since obligatory offerings during the period of Gilgal, in relation to the period of Shiloh, are considered offerings whose time has not yet arrived, and Moses said to the Jewish people concerning them: “You shall not do,” during that period, it follows that one who sacrifices an offering whose time has not yet arrived is in violation of the prohibition: “You shall not do.”

קלאוד על הדף:

The logic: obligatory offerings in Gilgal were “מְחוּסַּר זְמַן” (lacking time) relative to Shiloh — they couldn’t be brought yet. Moses applied the prohibition “לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן” to these offerings. By analogy, any offering that is currently unfit but will become fit later falls under this same prohibition when sacrificed prematurely outside the Temple.

Segment 13

TYPE: קושיא

Rabbi Yirmeya’s challenge to Rabbi Zeira

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה לְרַבִּי זֵירָא: אִי הָכִי…

English Translation:

Rabbi Yirmeya said to Rabbi Zeira: If so, anyone who sacrifices an offering whose time has not yet arrived, even if he sacrifices it inside the Temple courtyard…

קלאוד על הדף:

Rabbi Yirmeya raises a problem with this reasoning. If the prohibition “לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן” applies to offerings whose time hasn’t arrived, then it should apply even INSIDE the Temple! Someone who slaughters an underage dove inside the Temple should also violate this prohibition and receive lashes — but Rabbi Zeira elsewhere said one is exempt inside. How do we reconcile this?

Segment 14

TYPE: גמרא (המשך)

The challenge continues onto amud bet

Hebrew/Aramaic:

(continued on 114b)

קלאוד על הדף:

The question is left incomplete as the amud ends, setting up the resolution on the next amud.

Amud Bet (114b)

Segment 1

TYPE: גמרא

Completion of Rabbi Yirmeya’s question and first answer

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מִילְקֵי נָמֵי לִילְקֵי! אַלְּמָה אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: הַכָּתוּב נִתְּקוֹ לַעֲשֵׂה?

English Translation:

Should also receive lashes for sacrificing it, just as one would for violating other Torah prohibitions. Why did Rabbi Zeira say elsewhere that one who slaughters, inside the Temple courtyard, an offering whose time has not yet arrived does not receive lashes for having violated the prohibition of “It shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 22:23)? Rabbi Zeira explains that he does not receive lashes because the verse has transmuted the negative precept into a prohibition that is stated as a positive mitzva, in the verse: “But from the eighth day forward it may be accepted” (Leviticus 22:27). There is no punishment of lashes for violating such a prohibition.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rabbi Yirmeya’s challenge is completed: if “לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן” applies, one should receive lashes even inside the Temple for sacrificing a premature offering! But Rabbi Zeira taught elsewhere that there are no lashes because the prohibition is “transmuted” into a positive command (“from the eighth day forward it may be accepted”). How can both be true?

Key Terms:

• נִתְּקוֹ לַעֲשֵׂה (nitko la-aseh) = Transmuted into a positive command — a prohibition coupled with a positive statement, which exempts from lashes
• מִלְקוֹת (malkot) = Lashes — punishment for violating negative commandments

Segment 2

TYPE: תירוץ

Resolution: Rabbi Zeira was speaking according to the Rabbis, not Rabbi Shimon

Hebrew/Aramaic:

הָנֵי מִילֵּי לְרַבָּנַן, לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הָכִי נָמֵי.

English Translation:

The Gemara responds: That statement of Rabbi Zeira applies only according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Shimon in the mishna and hold that the verse “You shall not do” does not indicate that one who slaughters an animal whose time has not yet arrived is in violation of a prohibition. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, one would indeed receive lashes for slaughtering an animal whose time has not yet arrived inside the Temple.

קלאוד על הדף:

The first resolution: Rabbi Zeira’s statement (that there are no lashes inside) follows the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Shimon. According to the Rabbis, the verse “לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן” doesn’t create a prohibition for premature offerings. But Rabbi Shimon DOES derive a prohibition from that verse — and according to him, yes, there would be lashes even inside the Temple.

Segment 3

TYPE: תירוץ נוסף

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak’s alternative answer

Hebrew/Aramaic:

רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק אָמַר: פְּנִים דְּגִלְגָּל לְגַבֵּי שִׁילֹה – כְּחוּץ דָּמֵי.

English Translation:

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: Rabbi Zeira’s statement is even in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who also holds that one would not receive lashes for slaughtering inside the Temple courtyard an offering whose time has not yet arrived. A prohibition cannot be derived from the prohibition stated with regard to the Tabernacle in Gilgal, since inside the Tabernacle in Gilgal, in relation to the Tabernacle in Shiloh, is considered like outside.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak offers a different answer that works even according to Rabbi Shimon. The key insight: during the Gilgal period, sacrificing inside the Gilgal Tabernacle was equivalent to sacrificing OUTSIDE relative to Shiloh. The prohibition “לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן” only applies to sacrificing outside — not inside a proper sanctuary. So even Rabbi Shimon agrees: inside the Temple there are no lashes.

Key Terms:

• פְּנִים (penim) = Inside — within the sacred precinct
• חוּץ (chutz) = Outside — beyond the sacred precinct

Segment 4

TYPE: גמרא

Rabba offers an alternative source for Rabbi Shimon’s ruling

Hebrew/Aramaic:

רַבָּה אָמַר: טַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן – כִּדְתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: מִנַּיִן לַזּוֹבֵחַ פֶּסַח בְּבָמַת יָחִיד בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת, שֶׁהוּא בְּלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״לֹא תוּכַל לִזְבֹּחַ אֶת הַפָּסַח״.

English Translation:

Rabba said: The reason of Rabbi Shimon is not based upon “You shall not do,” as Reish Lakish claims, but upon another verse. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: From where is it derived that one who slaughters his Paschal offering on a private altar at a time when it is prohibited to sacrifice offerings on private altars violates a prohibition? The verse states: “You may not sacrifice the Paschal offering within any of your gates” (Deuteronomy 16:5–6).

קלאוד על הדף:

Rabba disagrees with Reish Lakish’s derivation. He brings a baraita where Rabbi Shimon himself explains his source — not from “לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן” but from Deuteronomy 16:5 regarding the Paschal offering. The verse prohibits slaughtering the Pesach “within your gates” (i.e., on a private altar). This teaches that even when private altars were generally permitted, the Pesach was forbidden on them.

Key Terms:

• בָּמַת יָחִיד (bamat yachid) = Private altar — permitted for some offerings during certain periods
• קָרְבָּן פֶּסַח (korban Pesach) = Paschal offering — the Passover sacrifice

Segment 5

TYPE: ברייתא (המשך)

When does this prohibition apply?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

יָכוֹל אַף בִּשְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר הַבָּמוֹת כֵּן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בְּאַחַד שְׁעָרֶיךָ״ – לֹא אָמַרְתִּי לְךָ אֶלָּא בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁכׇּל יִשְׂרָאֵל נִכְנָסִין בְּשַׁעַר אֶחָד.

English Translation:

One might have thought that even at a time when it is permitted to sacrifice offerings on private altars this is so. Therefore, the verse states: “Within any [be’achad] of your gates,” which indicates that I said this prohibition to you only when all of the Jewish people enter the Temple through one [echad] gate in order to sacrifice their offerings. When there is no permanent communal altar, it is permitted to slaughter the Paschal offering on a private altar.

קלאוד על הדף:

The baraita continues: maybe the Pesach is ALWAYS forbidden on private altars? No — the verse says “בְּאַחַד” (in one/any), which is read midrashically as “when Israel enters through ONE gate” — meaning when there’s a central sanctuary. When private altars were permitted (no central sanctuary), even the Pesach could be brought on a private altar. The prohibition only applies when there IS a central location.

Key Terms:

• הֶיתֵּר הַבָּמוֹת (heter ha-bamot) = Permission for private altars — periods when private altars were allowed
• אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת (issur ha-bamot) = Prohibition of private altars — periods when they were forbidden

Segment 6

TYPE: גמרא

Rabba’s analysis: When was this Pesach slaughtered?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אֵימַת? אִי נֵימָא אַחַר חֲצוֹת – כָּרֵת נָמֵי מִחַיַּיב! אֶלָּא לָאו קוֹדֶם חֲצוֹת?

English Translation:

Rabba analyzes the baraita: When was this Paschal offering, for which one violates a prohibition for slaughtering it during a time when it is forbidden to sacrifice on private altars, slaughtered? If we say that it was after midday on the fourteenth of Nisan, which is the proper time for sacrificing the Paschal offering in the Temple, then one who sacrifices it then violates not only a prohibition, he should also be deemed liable to receive karet as well. Rather, is it not discussing one who slaughtered the Paschal offering on a private altar before midday, when its time had not yet arrived?

קלאוד על הדף:

Rabba asks: when was this Pesach slaughtered? If after midday on the 14th of Nisan (the proper time), then slaughtering outside the Temple would incur KARET, not just a prohibition! The baraita only mentions a prohibition — so it must be discussing slaughtering BEFORE midday, when the Pesach’s time hasn’t arrived yet. This proves Rabbi Shimon’s point: slaughtering a premature offering violates a prohibition.

Segment 7

TYPE: דחייה

The Gemara rejects Rabba’s proof

Hebrew/Aramaic:

לְעוֹלָם לְאַחַר חֲצוֹת, וּבִשְׁעַת הֶיתֵּר הַבָּמוֹת קָאֵי.

English Translation:

The Gemara rejects Rabba’s explanation: Actually, the Paschal offering may have been sacrificed on a private altar after midday of the fourteenth of Nisan, and it is referring to a time when it is permitted to sacrifice on private altars, i.e., the periods of Gilgal, Nov, and Gibeon.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara challenges Rabba’s proof. Actually, the baraita could be discussing slaughtering the Pesach after midday (proper time), but during a period when private altars were generally permitted (Gilgal, Nov, or Gibeon). Even then, the Pesach specifically was forbidden on private altars. So this isn’t proof about premature offerings.

Segment 8

TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ

But the baraita says “when it is prohibited”!

Hebrew/Aramaic:

וְהָא בִּשְׁעַת אִיסּוּר הַבָּמוֹת קָאָמַר! אִיסּוּר בָּמָה לוֹ, הֶיתֵּר בָּמָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ.

English Translation:

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the baraita state: “At a time when it is prohibited to sacrifice offerings on private altars”? The Gemara responds: The baraita means that it is prohibited for one to sacrifice the Paschal offering on a private altar, but it is permitted to use a private altar for another offering, i.e., a voluntary vow offering or gift offering.

קלאוד על הדף:

A textual challenge: the baraita explicitly says “at a time when private altars are PROHIBITED”! The Gemara answers: “prohibited” refers specifically to the Pesach — private altars are forbidden FOR IT. But other offerings (voluntary ones) were permitted on private altars. The prohibition is on the Pesach, not on the altar itself.

Segment 9

TYPE: משנה

New topic: People whose time hasn’t arrived and their offerings

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מְחוּסַּר זְמַן כּוּ׳. וְהָנֵי בְּנֵי אֲשָׁמוֹת נִינְהוּ?! אָמַר זְעֵירִי: תְּנִי מְצֹרָע בַּהֲדַיְיהוּ.

English Translation:

The mishna teaches that with regard to an offering whose time has not yet arrived because it is premature for its owner, one who sacrifices it outside the Temple courtyard is exempt. This category includes a zav, a zava, and a woman after childbirth. The Gemara asks: And are these individuals subject to the obligation to bring guilt offerings? Ze’eiri said: Teach leper together with the zav, zava, and woman after childbirth. A leper brings a guilt offering as part of his purification process.

קלאוד על הדף:

The mishna mentioned that a zav, zava, and yoledet (woman after childbirth) who slaughter their sin or guilt offerings outside during their counting days are exempt. The Gemara objects: these people don’t bring guilt offerings! Ze’eiri answers: add the LEPER (metzora) to the list — the metzora does bring a guilt offering. The mishna was abbreviating.

Key Terms:

• זָב (zav) = Man with abnormal discharge — requires purification offerings
• זָבָה (zavah) = Woman with abnormal discharge outside her period
• יוֹלֶדֶת (yoledet) = Woman after childbirth
• מְצֹרָע (metzora) = Leper — one afflicted with tzara’at

Segment 10

TYPE: גמרא

Another textual problem: Peace offerings

Hebrew/Aramaic:

עוֹלוֹתֵיהֶן וְשַׁלְמֵיהֶן. וְהָנֵי בְּנֵי שְׁלָמִים נִינְהוּ?! אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: תְּנִי נָזִיר. דִּזְעֵירִי קַבְעוּהָ תַּנָּאֵי, דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת לָא קַבְעוּהָ תַּנָּאֵי.

English Translation:

The mishna also teaches that if those whose time has not yet arrived sacrifice their burnt offerings or their peace offerings outside the Temple courtyard, they are liable. The Gemara asks: And are these individuals subject to the obligation to bring peace offerings? Rav Sheshet said: Teach the case of a Nazirite as part of the list. A nazirite brings a peace offering at the conclusion of his term. The Gemara notes that the addition of Ze’eiri (the leper) was fixed by the tanna’im in the version of the mishna, while the addition of Rav Sheshet (the nazirite) was not fixed.

קלאוד על הדף:

Another problem: the mishna says these people bring peace offerings, but zav, zava, and yoledet don’t bring shelamim! Rav Sheshet answers: add the NAZIRITE — a nazirite brings peace offerings at the end of the nazirite period. The Gemara notes an interesting transmission detail: Ze’eiri’s addition (the leper) became part of the standard text, but Rav Sheshet’s addition (the nazirite) remained a later amendment.

Key Terms:

• נָזִיר (nazir) = Nazirite — one who takes a vow of abstinence including from wine and haircuts
• שְׁלָמִים (shelamim) = Peace offerings — shared between altar, priests, and owner

Segment 11

TYPE: גמרא

Rabbi Chilkiya’s teaching about the leper’s guilt offering

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אָמַר רַבִּי חִלְקִיָּה דְּבֵי רַב טוֹבִי: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא לִשְׁמוֹ; אֲבָל שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ – חַיָּיב, הוֹאִיל וְרָאוּי לְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ בִּפְנִים.

English Translation:

Rabbi Chilkiya, a Sage from the school of Rav Tovi, says: They taught this — that one who slaughters a guilt offering outside the Temple during the counting days is exempt — only with regard to one who slaughters it for its own sake. But if he slaughtered it outside the Temple courtyard not for its own sake but for the sake of a different offering, he is liable for having sacrificed outside the courtyard. This is because it was fit to be sacrificed not for its own sake inside the Temple courtyard.

קלאוד על הדף:

Rabbi Chilkiya makes a subtle distinction. The mishna said one is exempt for slaughtering a premature guilt offering outside. But that’s only if slaughtered “לִשְׁמוֹ” (for its proper purpose). If slaughtered “שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ” (not for its proper purpose — as a different offering), one is LIABLE. Why? Because if brought INSIDE the Temple with the wrong intent, it would still be valid (a guilt offering slaughtered as a different offering is kosher, just doesn’t fulfill the obligation). Since it’s “fit” inside with wrong intent, slaughtering it outside with wrong intent incurs liability.

Key Terms:

• לִשְׁמוֹ (lishmo) = For its own sake — with proper intent
• שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ (shelo lishmo) = Not for its own sake — with improper intent

Segment 12

TYPE: קושיא

Challenge: If it’s fit with wrong intent, shouldn’t one be liable even with right intent?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

אִי הָכִי, לִשְׁמוֹ נָמֵי נִיחַיַּיב – הוֹאִיל וְרָאוּי לְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ בִּפְנִים! בָּעֵי עֲקִירָה.

English Translation:

The Gemara asks: If so, one who slaughtered the guilt offering for its own sake should also be liable for having slaughtered it outside the Temple courtyard, since it was fit to be slaughtered not for its sake inside the Temple courtyard. The Gemara answers: In order for a guilt offering that was slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard to be considered fit to be sacrificed inside it, it first requires uprooting of its status.

קלאוד על הדף:

The Gemara objects: if the animal is theoretically “fit” inside (with wrong intent), then even slaughtering it with RIGHT intent should incur liability! The answer: potential fitness isn’t enough. To be considered “fit,” the wrong intent must actually be expressed — the original status needs “uprooting.” Without active uprooting (intending it for a different offering), the animal retains its original status as a premature, unfit offering.

Key Terms:

• עֲקִירָה (akirah) = Uprooting — actively changing the designated purpose of an offering

Segment 13

TYPE: קושיא

Rav Huna’s objection: Can something be fit only with wrong intent?

Hebrew/Aramaic:

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב הוּנָא: וְכִי יֵשׁ לְךָ דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ כָּשֵׁר לִשְׁמוֹ, וְכָשֵׁר שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ?!

English Translation:

Rav Huna objects to Rabbi Chilkiya’s statement that a guilt offering whose time has not yet arrived is fit to be sacrificed inside if it is slaughtered not for its own sake: And is there anything that is not fit if its action is performed for its own sake, but is fit if its action is performed not for its sake?

קלאוד על הדף:

Rav Huna raises a logical objection: this seems backwards! An offering should be MORE fit when done properly (for its sake) than when done improperly (not for its sake). How can we have a situation where wrong intent makes something valid while right intent makes it invalid? The Gemara is about to provide examples…

Key Terms:

• מַתְקֵיף (matkif) = Objects/challenges — introduces a difficulty with the preceding statement

📝 Summary

Overview

Zevachim 114 continues the discussion of sacrificing outside the Temple courtyard and when liability applies. The daf addresses two main themes: (1) how various disqualified animals can still trigger the exemption rules (by first being consecrated, then becoming disqualified), and (2) the source and scope of Rabbi Shimon’s view that sacrificing a temporarily unfit offering outside violates a prohibition but doesn’t incur karet.

Amud Aleph Highlights

• Disqualification after consecration: The Gemara explains how each category of disqualified animal (bestiality, idol worship, prostitute’s payment, etc.) can occur with a consecrated animal. Bestiality works straightforwardly. Idol worship designation only works for lesser sanctity offerings that remain the owner’s property (per Rabbi Yosei HaGelili). Payment to a prostitute applies to offspring of consecrated animals.

• Why three cases are needed: The mishna lists Rabbi Shimon’s dispute with the Rabbis three times (blemished animals, underage doves, “itself and its offspring”). Each case is necessary because one might think the dispute only applies in that specific situation.

• Rabbi Shimon’s source: Reish Lakish derives Rabbi Shimon’s prohibition from Deuteronomy 12:8, which prohibited obligatory offerings during the Gilgal period. Since those offerings’ “time hadn’t arrived” (relative to Shiloh), and the Torah said “לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן,” any premature offering outside violates this prohibition.

Amud Bet Highlights

• Lashes inside the Temple?: Rabbi Yirmeya challenges: if the prohibition applies, shouldn’t one receive lashes even inside? Two answers: (1) Rabbi Zeira spoke according to the Rabbis, not Rabbi Shimon; (2) Inside Gilgal was like “outside” relative to Shiloh, so the prohibition only applies outside.

• Rabba’s alternative source: The prohibition comes from the Paschal offering verse (Deuteronomy 16:5), not from “לֹא תַעֲשׂוּן.”

• Textual corrections: The mishna’s categories need additions — the leper (who brings a guilt offering) and the nazirite (who brings peace offerings).

• Fit with wrong intent: Rabbi Chilkiya teaches that a premature guilt offering slaughtered outside with wrong intent incurs liability because it would be valid inside with wrong intent. Rav Huna challenges: how can something be fit only with wrong intent?

Key Disputes

Conclusions

• Disqualified animals that were initially consecrated then became unfit require a specific verse to exclude them from liability for slaughtering outside.
• According to Rabbi Shimon, there is a Torah prohibition (but no karet) for sacrificing outside an offering whose time hasn’t yet arrived.
• The dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis applies across multiple categories for different reasons.

Key Figures

Tannaim: Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, Rabbis

Amoraim: Reish Lakish, Rabbi Ile’a, Rabbi Yirmeya, Rabbi Zeira, Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, Rabba, Ze’eiri, Rav Sheshet, Rabbi Chilkiya, Rav Huna

One-Line Takeaway

Even offerings that will eventually become fit are treated seriously — sacrificing them outside the Temple prematurely may violate a Torah prohibition, reflecting the importance of proper timing in the sacrificial system.

🎯 ELI5 (Explain Like I’m 5)

The Big Picture 🖼️

This daf is about a tricky question: if an animal isn’t ready to be sacrificed yet (like a baby animal that’s too young, or an offering whose owner isn’t ready), what happens if someone sacrifices it in the wrong place? Is that a big deal or not?

How Does a Holy Animal Become “Bad”? 🐑❌

Okay, imagine you have a special toy that you promised to give to the museum. It’s now a “museum toy.” But then something happens to the toy that makes the museum not want it anymore.

The Gemara asks: Wait — if the toy already belongs to the museum, how can YOU do something to ruin it? You can’t break what’s not yours!

The answer: Some museum donations still kinda belong to you until the museum actually takes them. These are called קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים — “light donations.” You still have enough ownership that if you do something bad to them, it counts.

Think of it like… If you promise to donate your bike to charity but haven’t given it yet, and your friend dents it, that’s their problem. But if YOU dent it, that’s on you — because it’s still kinda yours!

The Simple Idea 💡: Some sacrifices still belong to the owner enough that they can mess them up.

Baby Animals and Waiting Your Turn 👶🐄

Another question: if an animal was paid to a… well, let’s just say someone you shouldn’t pay with animals… how does that happen to a holy animal?

The answer: We’re talking about BABIES of holy animals. The baby is holy because its mom is holy. But while it’s still inside mom, the baby can be affected by things that happen to mom. Once it’s born, it’s both holy AND affected by the problem!

Think of it like… Your mom’s frequent flyer miles — if she books a trip while you’re still little, you might inherit both the trip AND the restrictions that came with booking it!

The Simple Idea 💡: Baby animals of sacrifices become holy at birth, but can inherit problems from when they were still inside.

Rabbi Shimon’s Special Rule 📜

Rabbi Shimon has an interesting opinion: if you sacrifice an animal that’s not ready YET but will be ready LATER, you’ve done something wrong — but it’s not the WORST thing.

The Gemara asks: Where does he get this from?

Reish Lakish says: From when the Jews first entered Israel! Moses told them: “Right now in Gilgal, you can bring EXTRA sacrifices (like ‘thank you’ presents), but you can’t bring REQUIRED sacrifices yet. Wait until we set up the main Temple in Shiloh!”

Think of it like… It’s like when you’re setting up for a party. You can bring the decorations early (voluntary stuff), but don’t bring out the cake until everything’s ready (required stuff)!

The Simple Idea 💡: Even in the wilderness, there were rules about “not yet” — and those rules still apply to offerings that aren’t ready.

The “Inside vs. Outside” Puzzle 🏛️⬅️➡️

But wait! If bringing a “not ready yet” sacrifice is forbidden, shouldn’t you get in trouble even if you do it INSIDE the Temple?

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak explains: Gilgal (the first camp) was kind of like “outside” compared to Shiloh (the real Temple). The prohibition was about doing things in the wrong place at the wrong time — not about the Temple itself.

Think of it like… Eating dinner in the living room before the dining room is set up isn’t the same as eating in the dining room too early. The rule was about WHERE you are, not just WHEN!

The Simple Idea 💡: The prohibition about “not yet” offerings applies to sacrificing in the wrong place, not inside the Temple.

The Leper and the Nazirite Join the Party 🧑‍⚕️💇

The mishna listed people who are “not ready yet” to bring their offerings:

• People with certain impurities (זָב, זָבָה)
• Women after childbirth (יוֹלֶדֶת)

But wait — the mishna mentions guilt offerings and peace offerings. These people don’t bring those!

The Gemara fixes it: Add the LEPER (who brings a guilt offering) and the NAZIRITE (who brings peace offerings). The mishna was just giving examples!

Think of it like… If someone says “students can buy pizza, pasta, or ice cream,” and you know only high schoolers can buy ice cream — you’d add “high schoolers” to the list!

The Simple Idea 💡: The mishna’s categories include more people than it explicitly listed.

Right Intention vs. Wrong Intention 🎯

Here’s a brain-twister: What if you sacrifice a “not ready” offering with the WRONG intention (pretending it’s a different offering)?

Rabbi Chilkiya says: Then you’re LIABLE! Because if you did that INSIDE the Temple, it would actually be valid (wrong intention doesn’t invalidate most offerings).

But wait, says Rav Huna: That’s backwards! How can something be VALID with wrong intention but INVALID with right intention?

Think of it like… Imagine a test where guessing randomly gives you a passing grade, but answering correctly gives you a failing grade. That makes no sense!

The Simple Idea 💡: The Gemara is puzzled by cases where doing something “wrong” works better than doing it “right.”

The Super Simple Summary 🎯

• 🐑 Some holy animals can still be ruined by their owners because the owners still partially “own” them
• 👶 Baby animals of sacrifices become holy at birth but can inherit problems from pregnancy
• ⏰ Rabbi Shimon says sacrificing “not yet ready” offerings is forbidden (but not the worst sin)
• 🏛️ This prohibition applies to sacrificing in the wrong PLACE, not inside the Temple
• 📝 The mishna’s list of people includes lepers and nazirites who weren’t explicitly mentioned
• 🤔 It’s strange that wrong intention could make something more “valid” than right intention

⚖️ Halacha

1. Animals Disqualified After Consecration

Source in Daf: 114a, Segments 1-4

Rambam — Hilkhot Issurei Mizbeach 4:5

Hebrew:

הָרוֹבֵעַ וְהַנִּרְבָּע בֵּין שֶׁהָיְתָה הַבְּהֵמָה שֶׁלּוֹ בֵּין שֶׁהָיְתָה שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ בֵּין בְּאֹנֶס בֵּין בְּרָצוֹן בֵּין בְּזָדוֹן בֵּין בִּשְׁגָגָה בֵּין לִפְנֵי הֶקְדֵּשָׁהּ בֵּין לְאַחַר הֶקְדֵּשָׁהּ הֲרֵי זוֹ אֲסוּרָה לַמִּזְבֵּחַ. אֲבָל הַמֻּקְצֶה אִם הִיא שֶׁלּוֹ וְהֻקְצָה קֹדֶם שֶׁיַּקְדִּישׁ נִפְסַל. הִקְצָה שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ אוֹ שֶׁהִקְצָה שֶׁלּוֹ אַחַר שֶׁהִקְדִּישׁוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר. שֶׁאֵין אָדָם מַקְצֶה דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁלּוֹ.

English:

An animal that had relations with a person or that was sodomized becomes forbidden for the altar whether it belongs to the person with whom it shared relations or it belongs to a colleague, and regardless of whether those relations were carried out under compulsion or voluntarily, whether they were willful or inadvertent, or whether they were performed before the animal was consecrated or afterwards. When, by contrast, an animal is set aside for pagan worship, it becomes disqualified if it belonged to the person who set it aside and he set it aside before he consecrated it as a sacrifice. If, however, one set aside an animal belonging to a colleague or his own animal after he consecrated it as a sacrifice, it is permitted. The rationale is that a person cannot set aside an entity that does not belong to him for pagan worship.

Connection: The Rambam codifies the precise distinction discussed in our Gemara. Bestiality disqualifies an animal regardless of ownership or timing. But designation for idol worship only works if (a) it’s the owner’s animal and (b) it was designated before consecration — because once consecrated, it no longer fully belongs to the owner. The Gemara’s discussion of קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים (lesser sanctity offerings) belonging to the owner (per Rabbi Yosei HaGelili) is relevant for the exceptional case of peace offerings.

2. Offerings of Those Whose Time Has Not Arrived

Source in Daf: 114b, Segments 9-11

Rambam — Hilkhot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 18:9

Hebrew:

וְאֵי זֶהוּ מְחֻסַּר זְמַן בַּבְּעָלִים. קָרְבָּן שֶׁעֲדַיִן לֹא הִגִּיעַ זְמַן בְּעָלָיו לְהַקְרִיבוֹ. כֵּיצַד. הַזָּב וְהַזָּבָה וְהַיּוֹלֶדֶת שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ חַטָּאתָם בַּחוּץ בְּתוֹךְ יְמֵי סְפִירָה פְּטוּרִין. וְכֵן מְצֹרָע שֶׁשָּׁחַט חַטָּאתוֹ וַאֲשָׁמוֹ בַּחוּץ בְּתוֹךְ יְמֵי הַסְּפִירָה פָּטוּר.

English:

What is meant by a disqualifying time factor involving the status of its owners? A sacrifice whose owners have not reached the appropriate stage of time to offer it. What is implied? If a zav, a zavah, and a woman who gave birth slaughtered their sin-offerings outside the Temple Courtyard during the days of their counting, they are exempt. Similarly, if a person afflicted with tzara’at slaughtered his sin-offering and his guilt-offering outside the Temple Courtyard during the days of his counting, he is exempt.

Connection: The Rambam codifies exactly what our Gemara discusses. The mishna mentioned זָב, זָבָה, and יוֹלֶדֶת — and the Gemara (through Ze’eiri) added the מְצֹרָע who brings a guilt offering. The Rambam incorporates Ze’eiri’s correction into the final halacha. The key principle: if the owner isn’t yet “ready” to bring the offering (still counting purification days), slaughtering outside is exempt.

3. Guilt Offering with Wrong Intent

Source in Daf: 114b, Segments 11-12

Rambam — Hilkhot Ma’aseh HaKorbanot 18:10

Hebrew:

אָשָׁם מְצֹרָע שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ בַּחוּץ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ חַיָּב הוֹאִיל וְשֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ רָאוּי בִּפְנִים וְכָשֵׁר.

English:

When a guilt-offering for one afflicted by tzara’at was slaughtered outside the Temple Courtyard, but not for the desired intent, the one who slaughters it is liable. The rationale is that when such a sacrifice is not slaughtered for the desired intent in the Temple Courtyard, it is deemed appropriate and acceptable.

Connection: This is Rabbi Chilkiya’s teaching from our daf. The leper’s guilt offering, if slaughtered outside during the counting days with proper intent (לִשְׁמוֹ), is exempt — because the owner isn’t ready. But if slaughtered with wrong intent (שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמוֹ), one is LIABLE — because if done inside the Temple with wrong intent, it would be valid (just wouldn’t fulfill the obligation). The principle: liability outside depends on fitness inside.

4. The Paschal Offering on a Private Altar

Source in Daf: 114b, Segments 4-8

Rambam — Hilkhot Korban Pesach 1:3

Hebrew:

אֵין שׁוֹחֲטִין אֶת הַפֶּסַח אֶלָּא בַּעֲזָרָה כִּשְׁאָר הַקָּדָשִׁים. אַף בִּשְׁעַת הֶתֵּר הַבָּמוֹת לֹא הָיוּ מַקְרִיבִין אֶת הַפֶּסַח בְּבָמַת יָחִיד. וְכָל הַמַּקְרִיב אֶת הַפֶּסַח בְּבָמַת יָחִיד לוֹקֶה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא תוּכַל לִזְבֹּחַ אֶת הַפָּסַח בְּאַחַד שְׁעָרֶיךָ״. מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה לָמְדוּ שֶׁזּוֹ אַזְהָרָה לַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּבָמַת יָחִיד אֲפִלּוּ בִּשְׁעַת הֶתֵּר הַבָּמוֹת.

English:

The Paschal sacrifice may be slaughtered only in the Temple Courtyard like other sacrifices. Even when sacrificing in high places was permitted, the Paschal sacrifice would not be offered on an individual altar. Anyone who offers the Paschal sacrifice on an individual altar is liable for lashes, as Deuteronomy 16:5 states: “You may not sacrifice the Paschal sacrifice in one of your gates.” According to the Oral Tradition, this is a warning not to slaughter on an individual altar even during the time when sacrificing on the high places was permitted.

Connection: Our daf quotes the baraita that Rabbi Shimon uses as his source. The Paschal offering was ALWAYS restricted to the central altar, even during periods when private altars were permitted for other offerings. The verse “בְּאַחַד שְׁעָרֶיךָ” teaches this special restriction, and the Rambam codifies it as practical law with the punishment of lashes.

Summary of Rulings

Note: These Temple-era laws are preserved in Rambam’s Mishneh Torah for the time when the Temple is rebuilt. The Shulchan Aruch does not codify these laws as they are not currently applicable.

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📚 Tosafot

This daf contains 8 Tosafot entries — 3 on amud aleph and 5 on amud bet.

Amud Aleph (114a)

Tosafot 1: ד”ה אתנן ומחיר יוצא דופן וכלאים בוולדות קדשים

Gemara Context: Segment 5 — The Gemara explains that cases of payment to a prostitute (etnan), price of a dog (mechir), caesarean birth (yotzei dofen), and hybrid animals (kil’ayim) apply to offspring of sacrificial animals.

Hebrew:

אתנן ומחיר יוצא דופן וכלאים בוולדות קדשים - אתנן ומחיר לא מיתוקם בקדשים קלים אפילו לרבי יוסי הגלילי דאף על גב דממונו הוי אינו חל עליו כדדרשינן פ’ כל האסורין (תמורה ל:) לכל נדר פרט לנדור.

Translation:

“Payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog, caesarean birth, and hybrid animals — in offspring of sacrificial animals”: Payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog cannot be established even in offerings of lesser sanctity according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Even though the animal is considered the owner’s property, [these disqualifications] do not take effect on it, as we derive in Chapter “Kol Ha’asurin” (Temurah 30b) from “for any vow” — excluding that which is already vowed [i.e., consecrated].

What Tosafot is Addressing:

The Gemara explained that animals designated for idol worship can become disqualified even after consecration because lesser sanctity offerings remain the owner’s property. Tosafot asks: why doesn’t this same logic apply to etnan (prostitute’s payment) and mechir (dog’s price)? If the owner still “owns” the animal, shouldn’t he be able to give it as payment?

Tosafot’s Answer:

There’s a different exclusion at work. The verse says “for any vow” (לְכָל נֶדֶר) — the Torah excludes something already “vowed” (i.e., consecrated) from becoming etnan or mechir. So even though the owner retains ownership of lesser sanctity offerings, these specific disqualifications cannot apply to them. That’s why the Gemara had to explain these cases using offspring of sacrificial animals instead.

Key Insight:

Tosafot clarifies that “ownership” for halachic purposes isn’t monolithic. The owner can cause some disqualifications (like idol worship designation) but not others (like etnan/mechir). Each category has its own derivation and limitations.

Tosafot 2: ד”ה וקסבר ולדות קדשים בהוייתן הן קדושים

Gemara Context: Segment 6 — The Gemara states that offspring of sacrificial animals become sanctified only at birth, not in utero.

Hebrew:

וקסבר ולדות קדשים בהוייתן הן קדושים - וא”ת למה לי קרא למעוטי הלא חולין גמורים נינהו ודינם כשאר חולין לישחט בחוץ דאפילו פדיון לא בעו דאין קדושה חלה עליהן כלל…

Translation:

“And he holds that offspring of sacrificial animals are sanctified as they are [at birth]”: One might ask — why do I need a verse to exclude them? They are completely non-sacred (chullin) and have the same status as other non-sacred animals to be slaughtered outside! They don’t even require redemption, since no sanctity takes effect on them at all…

What Tosafot is Addressing:

This is a lengthy and complex Tosafot. The basic question is: if offspring are only sanctified at birth (not in utero), and etnan/mechir/kil’ayim/yotzei dofen animals can never become sanctified for sacrifice — why do we need a special verse to exclude them from liability for slaughtering outside? They should simply be non-sacred!

Tosafot’s Answer:

Tosafot distinguishes between two types of sanctity:

1. קדושת הגוף (kedushat ha-guf) — Bodily sanctity that makes the animal fit for the altar
2. קדושת דמים (kedushat damim) — Monetary sanctity that requires redemption

Even according to the view that offspring are sanctified “at birth,” these disqualified animals still have monetary sanctity — they need to be redeemed, just without requiring a blemish first. Since they have some level of sanctity, we need the verse to clarify their status regarding slaughtering outside.

Tosafot also addresses the case where someone explicitly consecrates these animals after they’re born — in that case, sanctity does take effect, and we need the verse’s exclusion.

Key Insight:

Tosafot reveals the layered nature of Temple sanctity. An animal can have monetary value to the Temple without being fit for the altar. This distinction is crucial for understanding many Temple laws.

Tosafot 3: ד”ה משום דפסולא דגופייהו

Gemara Context: Segment 10 — The Gemara explains why we need all three cases (blemished animals, underage doves, itself and offspring), noting that the first two have inherent disqualifications while the third has an external disqualification.

Hebrew:

משום דפסולא דגופייהו - בכל דוכתי משמע דפסול הגוף חמיר מפסולא דאתי מעלמא כדאמרינן בפרק קמא (לעיל זבחים דף ד.) מה לשינוי קודש שכן פסולו בגופו ובפסחים בסוף אלו דברים (פסחים דף עג:) נמי אמרינן כל שפסולו בגופו ישרף מיד דהא דמשמע הכא איפכא לאו משום דפסול הגוף קיל אלא הכי קאמר דמום עובר ותורין שלא הגיע זמנן הפסול תלוי בגופו ואם היה מום עובר מיד והתורים גדילין לאלתר היו ראויין אבל אותו ואת בנו אין הפסול תלוי בגופו שיועיל לו שום תיקון דלכולי יומא לא חזי.

Translation:

“Because their disqualification is inherent”: Everywhere [in the Talmud] it implies that a bodily disqualification is more severe than an external disqualification, as we say in the first chapter (Zevachim 4a) “what about a change in the type of sacrifice — for its disqualification is in its body,” and in Pesachim at the end of “Elu Devarim” (73b) we also say “anything whose disqualification is in its body must be burned immediately.” That which appears here to suggest the opposite is not because bodily disqualification is more lenient. Rather, this is what it means: A temporary blemish and doves whose time hasn’t arrived — the disqualification depends on its body, and if the blemish passed immediately or the doves grew up right away, they would be fit. But “itself and its offspring” — the disqualification doesn’t depend on its body such that any remedy would help, for the entire day it is unfit.

What Tosafot is Addressing:

Tosafot notices an apparent contradiction. Throughout the Talmud, “bodily disqualification” (pesul ha-guf) is treated as MORE severe than external disqualification. But here, the Gemara seems to say the opposite — that the Rabbis might be MORE lenient with “itself and its offspring” (external disqualification) than with blemished animals (bodily disqualification)!

Tosafot’s Answer:

Tosafot reframes the Gemara’s reasoning. The distinction isn’t about severity but about the NATURE of the disqualification:

• Blemished animals and underage doves: The problem is in the animal itself, BUT it can be fixed. The blemish can heal; the dove can mature. So there’s hope for the animal.

• “Itself and its offspring”: The problem isn’t in the offspring at all — it’s perfectly healthy! But for the entire day, no remedy exists. The parent was already slaughtered, and that fact cannot change.

The Gemara’s point is that we might think external disqualifications (where the animal itself is fine) are treated more leniently — hence we need all three cases.

Key Insight:

Tosafot teaches us to distinguish between “disqualification that can be remedied” and “disqualification without remedy.” An animal with a temporary problem it can grow out of is different from an animal facing an unchangeable external circumstance.

Amud Bet (114b)

Tosafot 4: ד”ה אלמה אמר רבי זירא הכתוב נתקו לעשה

Gemara Context: Segment 1 — Rabbi Yirmeya challenges: if there’s a prohibition against sacrificing premature offerings, one should receive lashes even inside the Temple! Rabbi Zeira elsewhere said the prohibition is “transmuted into a positive command” (nitkо la-aseh).

Hebrew:

אלמה אמר רבי זירא הכתוב נתקו לעשה - אין זה כשאר לאו הניתק לעשה דבפ’ בתרא דחולין (דף קמא.) ובפ’ ב’ דמכות (דף יד. טו. טז.) כגון לאו דגזילה ולקט שכחה ופיאה ונותר…

Translation:

“Why did Rabbi Zeira say the verse transmuted it into a positive command”: This is not like other negative commandments that are “transmuted into positive commands” discussed in the last chapter of Chullin (141a) and in the second chapter of Makkot (14a-16a), such as the prohibition of robbery, and leket, shikchah, pe’ah, and notar…

What Tosafot is Addressing:

The concept of “לאו הניתק לעשה” (a negative commandment transmuted into a positive one) usually means: if you violate the prohibition, you can rectify it by fulfilling a positive command (like returning stolen goods). In such cases, there are no lashes. But how does this apply to a premature offering? What positive command “fixes” sacrificing a too-young animal?

Tosafot’s Answer:

This is a DIFFERENT type of “transmutation.” It’s not that a positive command fixes the violation — rather, the Torah took this case OUT of the general prohibition and placed it under a positive statement instead.

The verse says “from the eighth day forward it shall be accepted” (Leviticus 22:27). This POSITIVE formulation implies that before the eighth day it’s not accepted — but the Torah chose to express this through a positive statement rather than a negative prohibition. This removes it from the category of prohibitions that incur lashes.

Tosafot compares this to the metzora (leper) who must “dwell alone” — a positive command that removes him from the general negative prohibition against impure people entering the camp.

Key Insight:

Tosafot reveals two different mechanisms both called “nitkо la-aseh”: (1) A prohibition that can be rectified by a positive action, and (2) A case removed from a general prohibition by being restated positively. Understanding this distinction is crucial for the laws of lashes.

Tosafot 5: ד”ה רב נחמן בר יצחק אמר פנים דגלגל

Gemara Context: Segment 3 — Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak explains that inside the Tabernacle in Gilgal was considered “like outside” relative to Shiloh.

Hebrew:

רב נחמן בר יצחק אמר פנים דגלגל כו’ - שינויא הוא דקמשני דאפילו לר”ש לא לקי במחוסר זמן בפנים כי אם בחוץ כדפי’ בקונטרס ויש גירסא אחרת בספרים לרבי שמעון ה”נ והא גלגל פנים הוא אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק פנים דגלגל כו’ וריש לקיש פריך דנפקא ליה מלא תעשון לאו במחוסר זמן דהאי קרא בגלגל קאי ופנים הוא…

Translation:

“Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: Inside of Gilgal, etc.”: This is an answer that he is providing — that even according to Rabbi Shimon, one does not receive lashes for [sacrificing] a premature offering inside [the Temple], only outside, as Rashi explained. And there is another textual version in the manuscripts: “According to Rabbi Shimon, indeed so! But Gilgal is inside!” Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: “Inside of Gilgal, etc.” And Reish Lakish asks: [if] he derives from “you shall not do” a prohibition for premature offerings, and this verse refers to Gilgal which is inside…

What Tosafot is Addressing:

Tosafot notes there are two different textual versions of this passage, which affect how we understand the flow of the argument. Is Rav Nachman answering a question, or is he responding to a challenge?

Tosafot’s Answer:

Tosafot presents both versions:

1. Our version: Rav Nachman’s statement is an independent answer explaining why Rabbi Shimon would agree there are no lashes inside the Temple — because the source verse (“לא תעשון”) referred to Gilgal, which was “like outside” relative to Shiloh.

2. Alternative version: Reish Lakish’s derivation is challenged — how can you derive a prohibition from a verse about Gilgal, which was “inside” the Tabernacle? Rav Nachman answers that Gilgal’s “inside” status was relative — compared to Shiloh (the future central sanctuary), Gilgal was like “outside.”

Key Insight:

This Tosafot demonstrates the importance of textual variants in understanding Talmudic arguments. The same words can serve different functions depending on how the passage is structured.

Tosafot 6: ד”ה אלא לאו קודם חצות

Gemara Context: Segment 6 — Rabba analyzes when the Paschal offering in the baraita was slaughtered, concluding it must be before midday (when its time hasn’t arrived).

Hebrew:

אלא לאו קודם חצות - ואע”ג דחזי בפנים שלא לשמו לא מיחייב כרת כיון דמחוסר עקירה ואין עומד האי ליעקר קודם זמנו.

Translation:

“Rather, is it not before midday”: And even though [the Paschal offering] is fit inside [the Temple] if [slaughtered] not for its own sake, one is not liable for karet, since it requires uprooting [of its status], and this [animal] is not destined to be uprooted before its time.

What Tosafot is Addressing:

The Gemara concluded the baraita discusses a Paschal offering slaughtered before midday. But wait — even before midday, a Paschal offering slaughtered with the WRONG intent (as a different offering) would be valid inside the Temple! So technically it’s “fit” inside. Shouldn’t that create liability for slaughtering outside?

Tosafot’s Answer:

Even though the animal COULD theoretically be valid inside with wrong intent, this doesn’t create liability because:

1. The animal “requires uprooting” (עקירה) — someone would need to actively intend it for a different purpose
2. “This animal is not destined to be uprooted before its time” — nobody actually intends to misuse a Paschal offering this way before its proper time

Since the theoretical fitness requires an unlikely active decision to change intent, it doesn’t count as being truly “fit for the altar.”

Key Insight:

Potential fitness isn’t the same as actual fitness. The law considers not just what’s theoretically possible but what’s practically intended. An animal that COULD be offered with wrong intent isn’t treated as “fit” if that’s not how it’s meant to be used.

Tosafot 7: ד”ה היתר במה לחבירו

Gemara Context: Segment 8 — The Gemara reinterprets “at a time when private altars are prohibited” to mean prohibited for the Paschal offering specifically, while other offerings were permitted.

Hebrew:

היתר במה לחבירו - ושעת היתר הבמות דקתני היינו קודם חצות דכשר בבמה שלא לשמו וא”ת דמשמע הכא דתורין שלא הגיע זמנן לרבי שמעון חיילא קדושה עלייהו והשוחטן בחוץ בלאו ובמעילה בפרק ולד חטאת (מעילה דף יב.) נמי אמר רבי שמעון דמועלין משום דראוין לאחר זמן ובתמורה בפרק אלו קדשים (תמורה דף יט:) גבי אשם בן שתים והביאו בן שנה אמר ר’ שמעון דכל עצמן אינם קדושים…

Translation:

“Permitted for a private altar for another [offering]”: And “the time when private altars were permitted” that is taught — this means before midday, when [a Paschal offering] is valid on a private altar if [slaughtered] not for its own sake. And one might ask: it implies here that according to Rabbi Shimon, doves whose time has not arrived — sanctity takes effect on them, and one who slaughters them outside [violates] a prohibition. And in Me’ilah in the chapter “Vlad Chatat” (12a), Rabbi Shimon also says one is liable for me’ilah because they are fit after their time. But in Temurah in the chapter “Elu Kodashim” (19b) regarding a guilt offering that should be two years old but he brought it one year old, Rabbi Shimon says they are not sanctified at all…

What Tosafot is Addressing:

This is a major Tosafot addressing an apparent contradiction in Rabbi Shimon’s position. Here and in Me’ilah, Rabbi Shimon holds that animals whose time hasn’t arrived DO have sanctity (hence the prohibition/me’ilah). But in Temurah, Rabbi Shimon says an animal brought at the wrong age “isn’t sanctified at all”!

Tosafot’s Answer:

Tosafot makes a crucial distinction:

• Animals unfit for ANY sacrifice (like underage doves or animals less than 8 days old): These CAN become sanctified because they’ll eventually be fit for sacrifice. Their “time deficit” is temporary and universal.

• Animals unfit for THIS specific sacrifice (like a one-year-old ram brought as a guilt offering that requires a two-year-old): These CANNOT become sanctified with “bodily sanctity” because they’re inherently wrong for this particular offering — even though they’d be fine for other offerings.

The key phrase: “כל מידי דלא חזי ליה לגופיה לא נחתא ליה קדושת הגוף” — “Anything not fit for its own [designated] purpose doesn’t receive bodily sanctity.”

Key Insight:

Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between universal time-deficits (which don’t prevent sanctity) and offering-specific mismatches (which do). An animal can be “premature” in a way that allows sanctification, or “wrong” in a way that doesn’t.

Tosafot 8: ד”ה דזעירי קבעוה תנאי

Gemara Context: Segment 10 — The Gemara notes that Ze’eiri’s addition (the leper) was incorporated by the Tanna’im into the standard mishna text, while Rav Sheshet’s addition (the nazirite) was not.

Hebrew:

דזעירי קבעוה תנאי - משום דמצורע יש בו טומאה כעין זב וזבה ויולדת אבל נזיר דלא דמי להו שייריה וכן בכריתות בפרק ארבעה מחוסרי כפרה (כריתות דף ח:) נמי אשכחן דתני זב וזבה ויולדת ומצורע והתם מפרש מאי טעמא לא תני מצורע ומצורעת כדקתני זב וזבה וניחא השתא לזעירי דבנזיר בלא מצורע סגי דאיכא תרתי בנזיר דנזיר טמא מביא אשם.

Translation:

“Ze’eiri’s [addition] was established by the Tanna’im”: Because the metzora (leper) has impurity similar to a zav, zavah, and woman after childbirth, but the nazirite who is not similar to them — [the Tanna’im] left him out. And similarly in Keritot in the chapter “Arba’ah Mechuserai Kaparah” (8b), we also find that it teaches “zav, zavah, woman after childbirth, and metzora.” And there it explains why it doesn’t teach “male metzora and female metzora” like it teaches “zav and zavah.” And now it works out well for Ze’eiri — that the nazirite without the metzora would suffice, since there are two [offerings] by a nazirite, for an impure nazirite brings a guilt offering.

What Tosafot is Addressing:

Why did the Tanna’im incorporate Ze’eiri’s addition (the metzora) into the mishna but not Rav Sheshet’s addition (the nazirite)?

Tosafot’s Answer:

The mishna’s list was organized thematically around impurity:

• Zav — impure due to abnormal discharge
• Zavah — impure due to abnormal bleeding
• Yoledet — impure due to childbirth
• Metzora — impure due to tzara’at

All four involve impurity that requires a waiting period before bringing offerings. The metzora fits naturally into this group.

The nazirite, however, doesn’t fit this pattern. A nazirite isn’t impure — they’re just in the middle of a vow. So even though the nazirite’s case is legally relevant (they bring peace offerings), it wasn’t incorporated into this impurity-focused list.

Tosafot adds that for Ze’eiri’s purposes, the nazirite alone (without explicitly mentioning the metzora) would have sufficed, since an impure nazirite brings both a guilt offering AND peace offerings — covering both categories the mishna mentioned.

Key Insight:

The Tanna’im organized mishnayot thematically, not just legally. Items that fit the conceptual framework were incorporated; items that were legally relevant but thematically different were left as later additions.