Menachot Daf 3 (מנחות דף ג׳)
Daf: 3 | Amudim: 3a – 3b | Date: January 14, 2026
📖 Breakdown
Amud Aleph (3a)
Segment 1
TYPE: תירוץ
The Gemara responds to a challenge about bird sin offerings
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמְרִי: דִּילְמָא מִיצּוּי דְּבָתַר הַזָּאָה הוּא, דְּאָמַר מָר: מִיצָּה דָּמָהּ בְּכׇל מָקוֹם בַּמִּזְבֵּחַ כְּשֵׁירָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: This is not considered recognizably false intent, as people might say: Perhaps it is actually a sin offering and he has already sprinkled its blood below the red line. And as for the fact that he squeezed its blood above the red line, they will say: It is the squeezing that follows sprinkling, which may be performed above the red line in the case of a sin offering. As the Master said: If one squeezed the blood of a bird sin offering in any place on the altar, the offering is valid. Since people might erroneously think that this bird is actually a sin offering, this intent is not considered recognizably false, so the offering is disqualified.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara explains why a bird burnt offering whose blood was squeezed above the red line for the sake of a sin offering is disqualified. Since observers might think this is actually a sin offering (because the squeezing after sprinkling can be done anywhere), the false intent is not recognizable, and therefore the offering is invalid.
Key Terms:
- מִיצּוּי (mitzui) = Squeezing out the remaining blood after sprinkling
- הַזָּאָה (haza’ah) = Sprinkling of blood
Segment 2
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge: A bird sin offering whose blood was sprinkled below the red line
Hebrew/Aramaic:
חַטַּאת הָעוֹף שֶׁהִזָּה דָּמָהּ לְמַטָּה לְשֵׁם עוֹלַת הָעוֹף תְּרַצֶּה, דְּמַעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ דְּחַטַּאת עוֹף הִיא, דְּאִי עוֹלַת הָעוֹף הִיא – לְמַעְלָה הֲוָה עָבֵיד לַהּ, וּמִיצּוּי הֲוָה עָבֵיד לַיהּ!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks another question: According to Rabba’s resolution, a bird sin offering whose blood a priest sprinkled below the red line for the sake of a bird burnt offering should effect acceptance, as the actions performed on it prove that it is a bird sin offering. Because if it is in fact a bird burnt offering, he would have performed it above the red line, and he would have performed the act of squeezing instead of sprinkling.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara challenges Rabba’s principle about “recognizably false intent.” If actions can prove what the offering really is, then a bird sin offering (sprinkled below) should be valid even when performed for the sake of a burnt offering (which requires sprinkling above), since the physical acts reveal its true identity.
Segment 3
TYPE: תירוץ
Response: Rabbi Shimon’s statement was about slaughtered offerings, not birds
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכִי נָמֵי, אֶלָּא לְפִי שֶׁאֵין הַמְּנָחוֹת דּוֹמוֹת לַזְּבָחִים קָאָמַר – לַזְּבָחִים, וְלֹא לָעוֹפוֹת.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: Indeed, according to Rabbi Shimon such a bird offering effects acceptance and fulfills the obligation of the owner. In fact, bird offerings were not discussed by Rabbi Shimon at all. Rather, he said: Because meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings, which means that they are not similar to slaughtered animal offerings, but he did not say that they are not similar to bird offerings.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara concedes that bird offerings do follow the principle of recognizable actions proving identity. Rabbi Shimon’s distinction between meal offerings and slaughtered offerings refers specifically to animal offerings, not birds. Bird offerings are treated separately.
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge: Most sacred offerings slaughtered in the north
Hebrew/Aramaic:
קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן בַּצָּפוֹן לְשֵׁם קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים, לִירַצּוֹ, מַעֲשֵׂיהֶן מוֹכִיחִין עֲלֵיהֶן דְּקׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים נִינְהוּ, דְּאִי קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים – בַּדָּרוֹם הֲוָה עָבֵיד לְהוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But if so, then offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered in the northern part of the Temple courtyard, which is a requirement that applies only to offerings of the most sacred order, for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, should effect acceptance for their owners, as the actions performed on them prove that they are offerings of the most sacred order. Because if they are in fact offerings of lesser sanctity, he would have performed their slaughter in the southern part of the Temple courtyard.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara tests Rabba’s principle with another case: if the slaughter location (north) proves an offering is most sacred (קדשי קדשים), then slaughtering it with intent for lesser sanctity offerings should still be valid, since observers can see it was slaughtered in the north.
Key Terms:
- קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים (kodshei kodashim) = Most sacred offerings (burnt offering, sin offering, guilt offering)
- קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים (kodashim kalim) = Lesser sanctity offerings (peace offering, thanks offering)
- צָפוֹן (tzafon) = North side of the Temple courtyard
Segment 5
TYPE: תירוץ
Response: Slaughter location doesn’t definitively prove offering type
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֵימוֹר דְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא אַף בַּדָּרוֹם, בַּדָּרוֹם וְלֹא בַּצָּפוֹן מִי אָמַר? דִּתְנַן: שְׁחִיטָתָן בְּכׇל מָקוֹם בָּעֲזָרָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: The slaughter of an offering in the northern part of the Temple courtyard is not indicative of the type of offering one intends it to be, as one can say that the Merciful One states that offerings of lesser sanctity may be slaughtered even in the southern part of the courtyard. Did He say that these offerings must be slaughtered specifically in the southern part and not in the northern part? This is as we learned in a mishna (Zevachim 55a), that the slaughter of offerings of lesser sanctity may be performed in any place within the Temple courtyard.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara rejects the challenge. Slaughtering in the north doesn’t prove the offering is most sacred, because lesser sanctity offerings can also be slaughtered in the north – they may be slaughtered anywhere in the courtyard. The location is not definitive proof.
Segment 6
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge: Lesser sanctity offerings slaughtered in the south
Hebrew/Aramaic:
קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן בַּדָּרוֹם לְשֵׁם קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים לִירַצּוֹ, מַעֲשֵׂיהֶן מוֹכִיחִין עֲלֵיהֶן, דְּקָדָשִׁים קַלִּים נִינְהוּ, דְּאִי קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים – בַּצָּפוֹן הֲוָה עָבֵיד לְהוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If so, then offerings of lesser sanctity that one slaughtered in the southern part of the Temple courtyard for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order should effect acceptance for their owners, as the actions performed on them prove that they are offerings of lesser sanctity. Because if they are in fact offerings of the most sacred order, he would have performed their slaughter in the northern part of the Temple courtyard.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara tries the reverse case: slaughtering in the south definitively proves an offering is lesser sanctity (since most sacred offerings must be slaughtered in the north). So shouldn’t this make the false intent recognizable?
Segment 7
TYPE: תירוץ
Response: People might assume the priest simply transgressed
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמְרִי: קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים נִינְהוּ, וּמִיעְבָּר הוּא דַּעֲבַר, וּשְׁחַט לְהוּ בַּדָּרוֹם.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: The fact that an offering was slaughtered in the southern part of the Temple courtyard is not a clear indication that it was intended as an offering of lesser sanctity, as people might say: They are in fact offerings of the most sacred order, but the priest transgressed the mitzva to slaughter them in the northern part of the courtyard and slaughtered them in the southern part.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara explains that even slaughtering in the south doesn’t make false intent recognizable, because observers might assume the priest simply violated the rule and slaughtered a most sacred offering in the wrong location. Human error is always a possibility.
Segment 8
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge: The pan vs. deep-pan case
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי הָכִי, מַחֲבַת לְשֵׁם מַרְחֶשֶׁת נָמֵי, הַאי דְּקָא קָמֵיץ לֵהּ לְמַרְחֶשֶׁת, אֲמַר: הַאי בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת נְדַר, וְהָא דְּמַיְיתֵי לַהּ בְּמַחֲבַת – דְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת הִיא, וּמִעְבָּר הוּא דַּעֲבַר וְאַתְיַיהּ בְּמַחֲבַת!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If so, i.e., if people might suspect an individual of performing the rite of an offering in an improper manner, then if a priest removes a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering as well, one who sees that this priest removes a handful for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering might say: This owner took a vow to bring a meal offering in a deep pan, and as for the fact that he brings it in a pan, it is actually the meal offering of a deep pan and the owner transgressed the mitzva to bring it in a deep pan, and brought it in a pan. Why, then, does Rabbi Shimon maintain that such a meal offering satisfies the obligation of its owner?
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara challenges: if we accept that observers might assume someone transgressed, the same logic should apply to meal offerings! If someone offers a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan, observers might think they vowed a deep-pan but transgressed by using a flat pan. So why is this offering valid according to Rabbi Shimon?
Key Terms:
- מַחֲבַת (machavat) = Flat frying pan for baking meal offerings
- מַרְחֶשֶׁת (marcheshet) = Deep frying pan for baking meal offerings
Segment 9
TYPE: תירוץ
Response: Even if vowed as deep-pan, bringing it in a pan makes it valid as a pan offering
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָתָם, כִּי נָמֵי בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת נָדַר, כִּי מַיְיתֵי לַהּ בְּמַחֲבַת – מַחֲבַת הָוְיָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains: There, where the priest removed the handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, even if the owner took a vow to bring a meal offering in a deep pan, when he brings it in a pan it is considered a valid pan meal offering, and therefore the priest’s intention is recognizably false.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara distinguishes this case: even if someone vowed a deep-pan offering, actually bringing it in a flat pan creates a valid flat-pan offering. The physical reality (flat pan) defines the offering type, making the priest’s contrary intent recognizably false.
Segment 10
TYPE: ראיה
Proof from a Mishnah about vessel vows
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כְּדִתְנַן: הָאוֹמֵר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי בְּמַחֲבַת״ וְהֵבִיא בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת, ״בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת״ וְהֵבִיא בְּמַחֲבַת – מַה שֶּׁהֵבִיא הֵבִיא, וִידֵי נִדְרוֹ לֹא יָצָא.
English Translation:
This is as we learned in a mishna (102b): One who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a pan, and he brought it in a deep pan, or if he says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal offering prepared in a deep pan, and he brought it in a pan, the meal offering that he brought, he brought, i.e., it is valid and the priest performs the rites of the meal offering that he actually brought, but he did not fulfill the obligation resulting from his vow, and he must bring another meal offering to fulfill that obligation.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara cites a Mishnah establishing that if you vow one type but bring another, what you brought is valid as the type you actually brought. You just haven’t fulfilled your original vow. This proves that the vessel used defines the offering.
Segment 11
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge: What if the owner specified “this flour” for a specific vessel?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְדִילְמָא אָמַר ״זוֹ לְהָבִיא בְּמַחֲבַת״ וְהֵבִיא בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת, כְּדִתְנַן: זוֹ לְהָבִיא בְּמַחֲבַת וְהֵבִיא בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת, בְּמַרְחֶשֶׁת וְהֵבִיא בְּמַחֲבַת – הֲרֵי זוֹ פְּסוּלָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But even so, the priest’s improper intent remains indiscernible, as people might think: Perhaps the owner said: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering that I must bring in a pan, and in spite of this he brought it in a deep pan. Such a meal offering is disqualified and is not considered a valid pan meal offering, as we learned in that same mishna: One who took a vow, saying: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering that I must bring in a pan, and he brought it in a deep pan, or if he vowed: This tenth of an ephah of flour is a meal offering that I must bring in a deep pan, and he brought it in a pan, it is disqualified, as he did not fulfill his vow. If so, how can Rabbi Shimon say that such a meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, when the intent is not recognizably false?
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara challenges again: if someone designated specific flour (“this flour”) for a specific vessel and then used a different vessel, the offering is completely invalid. So observers might think this is such a case, and the false intent wouldn’t be recognizable!
Segment 12
TYPE: תירוץ
Response: According to Rabbi Shimon, vessel designation doesn’t matter
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְרַבָּנַן הָכִי נָמֵי, לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: ״אַף יְדֵי נִדְרוֹ יָצָא״, אַלְמָא קְבִיעוּתָא דְמָנָא וְלָא כְּלוּם הוּא, וְלָא שְׁנָא אָמַר ״זוֹ״, וְלָא שְׁנָא אָמַר ״עָלַי״.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: According to the Rabbis, i.e., according to the opinion of the mishna just cited, there is indeed a difficulty. But according to Rabbi Shimon there is no difficulty, since with regard to a case where one took a vow, saying: It is incumbent upon me to bring a pan meal offering, and then he brought it in a deep pan, Rabbi Shimon says: He has fulfilled even the obligation resulting from his vow. Evidently, the designation of the vessel for a meal offering is nothing according to Rabbi Shimon, and there is no difference in this regard whether he said: This is for a particular type of meal offering, and there is no difference whether he said: It is incumbent upon me to bring a particular meal offering. In both instances the unique actions of each particular meal offering prove its identity, and therefore the owner fulfills his obligation regardless of the priest’s improper intent.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara resolves the difficulty by distinguishing between the Rabbis’ view and Rabbi Shimon’s view. According to Rabbi Shimon, vessel designation has no significance – whether you said “this flour” or “I obligate myself,” the actual vessel used determines what you brought. The physical actions always prove the offering’s identity.
Segment 13
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge: Burnt offering slaughtered for a sin offering
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, עוֹלָה שֶׁשָּׁחַט לְשֵׁם חַטָּאת תְּרַצֶּה, דְּהַאי זָכָר וְהַאי נְקֵבָה, כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא שְׂעִיר נָשִׂיא דְּזָכָר הוּא – לָא יְדִיעַ.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If that is so, that in a case where the manner of its preparation proves the identity of an offering the owner fulfills his obligation, then a burnt offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering should effect acceptance. His actions prove that it is a burnt offering, as this, a burnt offering, is always male, and that, a sin offering, is female. The Gemara answers: Since there is one sin offering, the goat of the Nasi, which is male, it is unknown whether this animal was a burnt offering or the sin offering of the Nasi, and its gender is not conclusive proof.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara tests whether gender can prove an offering’s identity. Burnt offerings are male; most sin offerings are female. But the Nasi’s (leader’s) sin offering is a male goat, so gender alone doesn’t definitively prove the offering type.
Key Terms:
- עוֹלָה (olah) = Burnt offering, always male
- חַטָּאת (chatat) = Sin offering, usually female
- שְׂעִיר נָשִׂיא (se’ir nasi) = The leader’s goat sin offering, which is male
Segment 14
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge: What if he specifically said “for an individual’s sin offering”?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר: ״לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת יָחִיד״, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? וְתוּ, חַטַּאת יָחִיד שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם עוֹלָה תְּרַצֶּה, דְּחַטָּאת נְקֵבָה וְעוֹלָה זָכָר? מִיכַּסְּיָא בְּאַלְיָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara continues to ask: But in a case where one said: I am hereby slaughtering this animal for the sake of a sin offering of an individual, which is always female, what can be said? Since a male animal cannot be mistaken for such a sin offering, why doesn’t this burnt offering satisfy the obligation of the owner? And furthermore, a sin offering of an individual that one slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering should effect acceptance, as such a sin offering is always female, and a burnt offering is always male. The Gemara responds: It is difficult to discern whether a lamb is male or female, as its genitals are covered by its tail.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara presses further: individual sin offerings are always female, so specifying “for an individual’s sin offering” should make gender determinative. The response is practical: lambs have tails that cover their genitals, making gender difficult to discern visually.
Segment 15
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Challenge: What about goats? Response: Gender differences aren’t noticed
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָתִינַח הֵיכָא דְּאַיְיתִי כִּבְשָׂה, אַיְיתִי שְׂעִירָה, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? אֶלָּא, בֵּין זְכָרִים לִנְקֵבוֹת לָאו אַדַּעְתַּיְיהוּ דְאִינָשֵׁי.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: This works out well in a case where one brought a female lamb as his sin offering, as its tail makes it difficult to discern its sex. But in a case where he brought a female goat, what can be said? Its gender is easily recognized, as goats do not have tails that cover their genitals. The Gemara answers: Rather, discerning between males and females is not on people’s minds, i.e., they do not take notice of the offering’s gender and therefore this aspect of an animal is not considered discernible.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara acknowledges the goat challenge (no tail covering), but concludes that in practice, people simply don’t pay attention to the gender of offerings. Gender is not “recognizable” in the relevant sense because it’s not something observers notice.
Segment 16
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge: Paschal offering for a guilt offering
Hebrew/Aramaic:
פֶּסַח שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ לְשֵׁם אָשָׁם לִירַצֵּי, דְּהַאי בֶּן שָׁנָה, וְהַאי בֶּן שְׁתֵּים, כֵּיוָן דְּאִיכָּא אֲשַׁם נָזִיר וַאֲשַׁם מְצוֹרָע, לָא פְּסִיקָא לֵיהּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara continues to challenge the opinion of Rabba: A Paschal offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a guilt offering should effect acceptance, as this, the Paschal offering, is in its first year, and that, a guilt offering, is in its second year. The Gemara answers: Since there are two guilt offerings that are brought from lambs in their first year, i.e., the guilt offering of a nazirite (see Numbers 6:12) and the guilt offering of a leper (see Leviticus 14:10), it is not definitively clear to an onlooker what type of offering this lamb is.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara tests age as a distinguishing factor. Paschal offerings are first-year animals; most guilt offerings are second-year. But two guilt offerings (nazirite and leper) use first-year animals, so age isn’t definitively distinguishing.
Key Terms:
- פֶּסַח (pesach) = Paschal offering, first-year lamb
- אָשָׁם (asham) = Guilt offering, usually second-year ram
- אֲשַׁם נָזִיר (asham nazir) = Nazirite’s guilt offering, first-year
- אֲשַׁם מְצוֹרָע (asham metzora) = Leper’s guilt offering, first-year
Segment 17
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge: What about specific guilt offerings that are second-year?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אָמַר: ״לְשׁוּם אֲשַׁם גְּזֵילוֹת וּלְשׁוּם אֲשַׁם מְעִילוֹת״, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר? וְתוּ, אֲשַׁם גְּזֵילוֹת וַאֲשַׁם מְעִילוֹת שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשׁוּם פֶּסַח לִירַצּוֹ, דְּפֶסַח בֶּן שָׁנָה וְהָנֵי בֶּן שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: But if one said: I am hereby slaughtering this lamb for the sake of a guilt offering for robbery, or if he said: I am slaughtering it for the sake of a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property, what can be said? These guilt offerings must each be brought from an animal in its second year, and therefore they cannot be mistaken for a Paschal offering, which is in its first year. And furthermore, a guilt offering for robbery or a guilt offering for misuse of consecrated property that one slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering should effect acceptance, as a Paschal offering is always in its first year, and these are in their second year.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara presses: if someone specifically states intent for a robbery guilt offering or misuse guilt offering (both second-year), the age difference should be recognizable. And vice versa – a second-year guilt offering slaughtered for a first-year Paschal should be obviously wrong.
Segment 18
TYPE: תירוץ
Response: Age differences are not noticed
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא, בֵּין בֶּן שָׁנָה לְבֵין בֶּן שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים לָאו אַדַּעְתַּיְיהוּ דְאִינָשֵׁי, דְּאִיכָּא בֶּן שָׁנָה דְּמִיחֲזֵי כְּבֶן שְׁתַּיִם, וְאִיכָּא בֶּן שְׁתַּיִם דְּמִיחֲזֵי כְּבֶן שָׁנָה.
English Translation:
The Gemara answers: Rather, the difference in appearance between an animal that is in its first year and one that is in its second year is not on people’s minds, i.e., this is not a clearly recognizable difference, as there can be an animal in its first year that appears as though it is in its second year, and there can be an animal in its second year that appears as though it is in its first year.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara concludes that age, like gender, isn’t reliably recognizable. Animals grow at different rates – some first-year animals look older, some second-year animals look younger. Observers can’t definitively determine age by appearance.
Segment 19
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Challenge: Goat sin offering for a guilt offering (wool vs. hair)
Hebrew/Aramaic:
שָׂעִיר שֶׁשְּׁחָטוֹ לְשׁוּם אָשָׁם לִירַצֵּי, דְּהַאי צֶמֶר וְהַאי שֵׂיעָר, אָמְרִי: דִּיכְרָא אוּכָּמָא הוּא.
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: A goat sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a guilt offering should effect acceptance. It is clearly not a guilt offering, as this, a guilt offering, is a ram, with white wool, and that, a goat, has black hair. The Gemara responds: People will say that this goat is actually a black ram, and they may indeed mistake it for a guilt offering.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara tests species differences: goats have hair, rams have wool. But the response is that a black ram might be mistaken for a goat, so even species differences aren’t always recognizable.
Segment 20
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Challenge: Calf or bull for Paschal/guilt offering
Hebrew/Aramaic:
עֵגֶל וּפַר שֶׁשְּׁחָטָן לְשׁוּם פֶּסַח וְאָשָׁם, לִירַצּוֹ, דְּעֵגֶל וּפַר בְּפֶסַח וְאָשָׁם לֵיכָּא! אִין הָכִי נָמֵי,
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: A calf or a bull that one slaughtered for the sake of either a Paschal offering or a guilt offering should effect acceptance. It is clear that such animals cannot be either offering, as a calf or bull offering is not sacrificed either as a Paschal offering or as a guilt offering. The Gemara responds: Yes, it is indeed so, as according to Rabbi Shimon such offerings effect acceptance for their owners.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara finally finds a case where the false intent is recognizable: a calf or bull slaughtered for a Paschal or guilt offering. These species are never used for those offerings, so the intent is obviously false. Rabbi Shimon agrees such offerings are valid and effect acceptance.
Amud Bet (3b)
Segment 1
TYPE: גמרא
Clarifying “slaughtered offerings” means “most” slaughtered offerings
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמַאי זְבָחִים? רוֹב זְבָחִים.
English Translation:
And what does Rabbi Shimon mean when he says that meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings? He means that they are not similar to most slaughtered offerings. There are, however, certain slaughtered offerings whose preparation, which is unique to that particular offering, is proof that it is that offering. In those instances, Rabbi Shimon maintains that the offerings fulfill the obligations of their respective owners despite the improper intent.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara clarifies Rabbi Shimon’s position. When he said meal offerings differ from slaughtered offerings, he meant the majority of them. Some slaughtered offerings do have unique, recognizable preparations that prove their identity, and those are valid even with wrong intent.
Segment 2
TYPE: תירוץ
Rava’s resolution: Meal offering for meal offering vs. meal offering for animal sacrifice
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רָבָא אָמַר, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן – בְּקוֹמֵץ מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם מִנְחָה, כָּאן – בְּקוֹמֵץ מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם זֶבַח.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara cites another resolution of the apparent contradiction between the two baraitot that report conflicting opinions of Rabbi Shimon. Rava said: It is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that a meal offering that was sacrificed not for its own sake fulfills the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a meal offering. There, where he says that it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering.
What the Gemara is Doing:
Rava offers a new resolution to the contradiction in Rabbi Shimon’s statements. The distinction is between: (1) a meal offering performed for another meal offering type (valid), and (2) a meal offering performed for an animal sacrifice (invalid).
Segment 3
TYPE: גמרא
Rava’s reasoning from the verse “And this is the law of the meal offering”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם מִנְחָה – ״וְזֹאת תּוֹרַת הַמִּנְחָה״, תּוֹרָה אַחַת לְכׇל הַמְּנָחוֹת; מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם זֶבַח – ״וְזֹאת תּוֹרַת הַמִּנְחָה וְזֶבַח״ לָא כְּתִיב.
English Translation:
Rava elaborates: If one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a different meal offering he fulfills his obligation, as the verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7). This indicates that there is one law for all the meal offerings, i.e., they are all considered variations of the same offering, and are different only with regard to how they should be sacrificed ab initio. Conversely, if one sacrificed a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering, since the phrase: And this is the law of the meal offering and a slaughtered offering, is not written anywhere, there is no reason to conclude that one fulfills his obligation under such circumstances.
What the Gemara is Doing:
Rava provides biblical support: “And this is the law (torah) of the meal offering” teaches that all meal offerings share one law – they’re all meal offerings. But there’s no verse combining meal offerings with animal sacrifices, so crossing that boundary invalidates.
Segment 4
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Challenge: Doesn’t Rabbi Shimon base his ruling on “actions prove”?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא תַּנָּא ״מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ״ קָאָמַר? הָכִי קָאָמַר: אַף עַל גַּב דְּמַחְשָׁבָה דְּלָא מִינַּכְרָא הִיא, וְתִיפְּסֵל, ״וְזֹאת תּוֹרַת הַמִּנְחָה״ – תּוֹרָה אַחַת לְכׇל הַמְּנָחוֹת.
English Translation:
The Gemara questions how Rava can say that the verse “And this is the law of the meal offering” serves as the basis for the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: But doesn’t the tanna, i.e., Rabbi Shimon, say that his reasoning is that for any particular meal offering, its mode of preparation proves what it is? The Gemara explains that this is what Rabbi Shimon is saying: Even though sacrificing a meal offering for the sake of a different meal offering is a case where it is not recognizable that the intention fits the offering, i.e., the intent does not match the rites being performed, and the offering should therefore be disqualified, the verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering,” which teaches that there is one law for all the meal offerings.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara reconciles Rava’s verse-based explanation with Rabbi Shimon’s “actions prove” reasoning. Rabbi Shimon means: even though the intent isn’t recognizably false (normally problematic), the verse saves it by treating all meal offerings as one category.
Segment 5
TYPE: גמרא
Explaining “but with regard to slaughtered offerings it is not so”
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמַאי אֲבָל בִּזְבָחִים אֵינוֹ כֵן?
English Translation:
And what does Rabbi Shimon mean when he says: But with regard to slaughtered offerings it is not so? This clause indicates that the similarity between the rites of various slaughtered offerings is a reason why they should not be valid, whereas according to the above reasoning the opposite is so.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara explains the second part of Rabbi Shimon’s statement about slaughtered offerings. It clarifies why animal sacrifices don’t have the same leniency.
Segment 6
TYPE: תירוץ
Response: No unifying verse for slaughtered offerings
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אַף עַל גַּב דִּשְׁחִיטָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן, ״וְזֹאת תּוֹרַת הַמִּנְחָה וְזֶבַח״ לָא כְּתִיב.
English Translation:
The Gemara explains this part of Rabbi Shimon’s statement: Even though there is one manner of slaughter for all animal offerings, and therefore one might think that the owner has fulfilled his obligation despite the improper intent, the phrase: And this is the law of the meal offering and a slaughtered offering, is not written. In other words, it is not stated: This is the law of a slaughtered offering, in the manner that a verse states: “This is the law of the meal offering.” Therefore, the owner of a slaughtered offering does not fulfill his obligation if there is improper intent, notwithstanding the similarity between the acts of slaughter.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara explains: although all animal offerings are slaughtered the same way (which might suggest they’re interchangeable), there’s no unifying verse for animal offerings like there is for meal offerings. Without that verse, wrong intent remains disqualifying.
Segment 7
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge: Sin offerings for different sins
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, חַטָּאת חֵלֶב שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת דָּם, לְשׁוּם חַטַּאת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, לְשׁוּם חַטַּאת נָזִיר, לְשׁוּם חַטַּאת מְצוֹרָע – תְּהֵא כְּשֵׁירָה וּתְרַצֶּה, דְּאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: ״וְזֹאת תּוֹרַת הַחַטָּאת״, תּוֹרָה אַחַת לְכׇל חַטָּאוֹת!
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the phrase “And this is the law of the meal offering” teaches that a meal offering is not disqualified despite the improper intent for a different meal offering, then analogously, a sin offering brought to atone for eating forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering to atone for drinking blood, or for the sake of a sin offering to atone for idol worship, or for the sake of a sin offering of a nazirite, or for the sake of a sin offering of a leper should be valid and effect acceptance. As the Merciful One states: “And this is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), from which it should be derived that there is one law for all sin offerings.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara challenges: there’s a similar verse for sin offerings (“And this is the law of the sin offering”). So shouldn’t all sin offerings be interchangeable too? A sin offering for eating fat should be valid even if performed for a sin offering for drinking blood!
Segment 8
TYPE: תירוץ
Response: According to Rabbi Shimon, yes; according to the Rabbis, distinctions apply
Hebrew/Aramaic:
לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הָכִי נָמֵי, לְרַבָּנַן הָא אָמַר: חַטָּאת חֵלֶב שֶׁשְּׁחָטָהּ לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת דָּם, לְשׁוּם חַטַּאת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – כְּשֵׁרָה, לְשֵׁם חַטַּאת נָזִיר מְצוֹרָע – פְּסוּלָה, דְּהָנֵי עוֹלוֹת בַּהֲדַיְיהוּ נִינְהוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara responds: According to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, such a sin offering is indeed valid and effects acceptance for its owner. The Gemara notes: According to the Rabbis, Rava says: A sin offering brought to atone for eating forbidden fat that one slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering to atone for drinking blood or for the sake of a sin offering to atone for idol worship is valid. But if he slaughtered it for the sake of a sin offering of a nazirite or for the sake of a sin offering of a leper it is disqualified, as with regard to these offerings, there are burnt offerings brought together with them.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara distinguishes positions. According to Rabbi Shimon, all sin offerings are indeed interchangeable. According to the Rabbis, regular sin offerings (for fat, blood, idolatry) are interchangeable, but nazirite/leper sin offerings are different because they come with burnt offerings, creating a distinct set.
Segment 9
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Acha son of Rava’s stricter view
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא מַתְנֵי לֵיהּ לְכוּלְּהוּ לִפְסוּלָא, ״וְשָׁחַט אוֹתָהּ לְחַטָּאת״ – לְשֵׁם אוֹתוֹ חַטָּאת.
English Translation:
Rav Acha, son of Rava, teaches that Rava holds that the halakha in all of these cases is disqualification of the sin offering. The reason is that the verse states: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33). The word “it” indicates that it must be sacrificed for the sake of that particular sin offering, and it may not be slaughtered for the sake of a different one.
What the Gemara is Doing:
Rav Acha son of Rava presents a stricter interpretation: the verse “slaughter it for a sin offering” emphasizes “it” – that specific sin offering. Any sin offering slaughtered for a different sin offering is disqualified, regardless of category.
Segment 10
TYPE: תירוץ
Rav Ashi’s resolution: Intent for vessel vs. intent for offering type
Hebrew/Aramaic:
רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן – בְּקוֹמֵץ מִנְחַת מַחֲבַת לְשׁוּם מַרְחֶשֶׁת, כָּאן – בְּקוֹמֵץ מִנְחַת מַחֲבַת לְשׁוּם מִנְחַת מַרְחֶשֶׁת.
English Translation:
§ The Gemara cites a third resolution of the apparent contradiction between the two baraitot that report conflicting opinions of Rabbi Shimon. Rav Ashi said that it is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering is fit and fulfills the obligation of the owner, he is referring to a case where one states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, i.e., he mentions only the vessel and not the offering. There, where it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering.
What the Gemara is Doing:
Rav Ashi offers a third resolution. The distinction is between intent for a vessel (valid) vs. intent for an offering type (invalid). Saying “for a deep pan” (vessel only) differs from “for a deep-pan meal offering” (offering type).
Segment 11
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Ashi’s elaboration: Vessel intent vs. offering intent
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִנְחַת מַחֲבַת לְשׁוּם מַרְחֶשֶׁת – בְּמָנָא קָא מְחַשֵּׁב, וּמַחְשָׁבָה בְּמָנָא לָא פָּסְלָה; מִנְחַת מַחֲבַת לְשׁוּם מִנְחַת מַרְחֶשֶׁת – בְּמִנְחָה דְּפָסְלָה בָּהּ מַחְשָׁבָה קָא מְחַשֵּׁב.
English Translation:
Rav Ashi elaborates: When one bringing a pan meal offering states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, he has intent only with regard to the type of vessel, and intention with regard to the type of vessel does not disqualify offerings, as he is not sacrificing the vessel, and therefore the owner’s obligation is fulfilled. By contrast, when he states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, he has intent with regard to the type of meal offering, which improper intention does disqualify. Consequently, the owner’s obligation is not fulfilled.
What the Gemara is Doing:
Rav Ashi explains: intent about a vessel doesn’t affect validity because you don’t sacrifice the vessel. Intent about an offering type does affect validity because offerings have distinct identities. The level of specificity in the intent matters.
Segment 12
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Challenge: Doesn’t Rabbi Shimon say “actions prove”? Response: Reinterpretation
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וְהָא תַּנָּא ״מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּעֲשֶׂיהָ מוֹכִיחִין עָלֶיהָ״ קָאָמַר? הָכִי קָאָמַר: אַף עַל גַּב דְּמַחְשָׁבָה מִינְּכַר הִיא, תִּיפְּסֵל.
English Translation:
The Gemara questions how Rav Ashi can maintain that this is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon: But doesn’t the tanna, i.e., Rabbi Shimon, say that his reasoning is that for any particular meal offering, its mode of preparation proves what it is? The Gemara explains that this is what Rabbi Shimon is saying: Even though when he removes a handful from a pan meal offering explicitly for the sake of a deep pan, it is a case where the falseness of the intention is recognizable and the offering should therefore be disqualified, it is nevertheless valid and fulfills the owner’s obligation, as intentions with regard to the vessel are irrelevant.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara reconciles Rav Ashi’s explanation with Rabbi Shimon’s “actions prove” statement. The point is: even though vessel intent is recognizably false, it still doesn’t disqualify because vessel intent is simply irrelevant.
Segment 13
TYPE: גמרא
Explaining “but with regard to slaughtered offerings it is not so” according to Rav Ashi
Hebrew/Aramaic:
וּמַאי אֲבָל בִּזְבָחִים אֵינוֹ כֵן? אַף עַל גַּב דִּשְׁחִיטָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן, זְרִיקָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן, קַבָּלָה אַחַת לְכוּלָּן – בִּזְבִיחָה דְּפָסְלָה בֵּיהּ מַחְשָׁבָה קָא מְחַשֵּׁב.
English Translation:
The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Shimon mean when he says: But with regard to slaughtered offerings it is not so? He means that even though there is one manner of slaughter for all offerings, and one manner of sprinkling of the blood for all offerings, and one manner of collection of the blood for all offerings, i.e., if one performs any of these rites for the sake of a different offering it is not recognizable that his intent is false, and therefore it might have been thought that the owner does fulfill his obligation, nevertheless he has improper intent with regard to an aspect of slaughtering, such as slaughtering a burnt offering for the sake of a peace offering, which improper intention does disqualify.
What the Gemara is Doing:
According to Rav Ashi, Rabbi Shimon’s statement about slaughtered offerings means: even though the physical acts (slaughter, collection, sprinkling) are identical for all offerings, intent about the offering type itself still disqualifies because that intent concerns the essence of the sacrifice.
Segment 14
TYPE: קושיא ותירוץ
Challenge from dry vs. mixed meal offering
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: חֲרֵבָה מִשּׁוּם בְּלוּלָה, אַמַּאי אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לְשׁוּם בִּילָּה בְּעָלְמָא.
English Translation:
Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: If this is the reasoning of Rabbi Shimon, then with regard to a case where one removes a handful from a dry meal offering for the sake of a meal offering mixed with oil, why did Rabbi Shimon say that it fulfills the owner’s obligation? Since his intent concerns the meal offering itself, it should disqualify the offering. Rav Ashi said to him: When Rabbi Shimon says that such a meal offering fulfills the owner’s obligation he is referring to a case where one removes the handful merely for the sake of mixing, not for the sake of a meal offering mixed with oil.
What the Gemara is Doing:
Rav Acha challenges Rav Ashi: Rabbi Shimon says a dry meal offering for a mixed one is valid, but that’s offering-type intent! Rav Ashi responds: “for mixing” (the action/ingredient) differs from “for a mixed meal offering” (the offering type).
Segment 15
TYPE: קושיא
Challenge: What about “for the sake of shelamim (peace offerings)”?
Hebrew/Aramaic:
אִי הָכִי, לְשׁוּם שְׁלָמִים נָמֵי, לְשׁוּם שְׁלָמִים בְּעָלְמָא?
English Translation:
The Gemara challenges: If so, then when one slaughters a burnt offering for the sake of a peace offering as well, one can say that his intent is merely for the sake of peace [shelamim] between himself and God. Why then does Rabbi Shimon say that this burnt offering does not fulfill the obligation of the owner?
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara challenges: couldn’t “for shelamim” mean “for peace” (the general concept) rather than “for a peace offering”? That would make the intent about a concept, not an offering type, and should be valid!
Segment 16
TYPE: תירוץ
Response: The offering itself is called shelamim
Hebrew/Aramaic:
הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא? הָתָם זֶבַח גּוּפֵהּ אִיקְּרִי שְׁלָמִים, דִּכְתִיב: ״הַמַּקְרִיב אֶת דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים״, ״הַזֹּרֵק אֶת דַּם הַשְּׁלָמִים״. הָכָא מִנְחָה גּוּפַהּ מִי אִיקְּרַי בְּלוּלָה? ״וְכׇל מִנְחָה בְלוּלָה בַשֶּׁמֶן״ כְּתִיב, ״בְּלוּלָה בַשֶּׁמֶן״ אִיקְּרַי, ״בְּלוּלָה״ סְתָמָא לָא אִיקְּרַי.
English Translation:
The Gemara rejects this challenge: How can these cases be compared? There, the offering itself is called shelamim, as it is written: “Who sacrifices the blood of the peace offering [shelamim]” (Leviticus 7:33), and it is also written: “Who sprinkles the blood of the peace offering” (Leviticus 7:14). Here, by contrast, is a meal offering itself called mixed? It is written: “And every meal offering, mixed with oil” (Leviticus 7:10), indicating that there is a meal offering that is called: Mixed with oil, but it is not simply called: Mixed. One’s intent to sacrifice a dry meal offering for the sake of mixing is therefore not a reference to the offering itself.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara distinguishes: “shelamim” is the name of the offering (appears in verses as the offering’s name), so saying “for shelamim” necessarily refers to the offering. But “mixed” is just a descriptor (“mixed with oil”), not the offering’s name. “For mixing” doesn’t refer to an offering type.
Segment 17
TYPE: גמרא
Summary: Why other Amoraim don’t follow Rabba’s approach
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כּוּלְּהוּ כְּרַבָּה לָא אָמְרִי, דְּאַדְּרַבָּה, מַחְשָׁבָה דְּמִנַּכְרָא פְּסַל רַחֲמָנָא.
English Translation:
§ Three resolutions have been suggested for the apparent contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon in two baraitot concerning whether or not a meal offering whose handful was removed not for its own sake fulfills the obligation of its owner. Rabba’s answer was that there is a difference between intent for another meal offering, in which case the owner fulfills his obligation, as the intent is recognizably improper, and intent for someone else, which is not recognizably improper. The Gemara comments: All the other Sages, i.e., Rava and Rav Ashi, do not say as Rabba did in resolving the contradiction, as they do not accept his reasoning, claiming that on the contrary, the Merciful One disqualifies recognizably false intent.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara summarizes why Rava and Rav Ashi reject Rabba’s approach. Rabba says recognizably false intent is disregarded (valid). Rava and Rav Ashi argue the opposite: the Torah specifically disqualifies recognizable intent!
Segment 18
TYPE: גמרא
Summary: Why other Amoraim don’t follow Rava’s approach
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כְּרָבָא לָא אָמְרִי, ״וְזֹאת תּוֹרַת״ לָא מַשְׁמַע לְהוּ.
English Translation:
The Gemara continues: Rava resolved the contradiction by saying that a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of another meal offering effects acceptance for the owner, as the verse states: “And this is the law of the meal offering” (Leviticus 6:7), indicating that there is one law for all meal offerings, whereas a meal offering from which a handful was removed for the sake of an animal offering does not effect acceptance. Rabba and Rav Ashi do not say as Rava did in resolving the contradiction, as the verse that states: “And this is the law of the meal offering,” does not indicate to them that there should be one law for all meal offerings.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara explains why Rabba and Rav Ashi reject Rava’s verse-based reasoning. They don’t read “And this is the law of the meal offering” as unifying all meal offerings.
Segment 19
TYPE: גמרא
Summary: Why other Amoraim don’t follow Rav Ashi’s approach
Hebrew/Aramaic:
כְּרַב אָשֵׁי לָא אָמְרִי, מִשּׁוּם קוּשְׁיָא דְּרַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרָבָא.
English Translation:
The Gemara continues: Rav Ashi resolved the contradiction by saying that when one removes the handful from a meal offering for the sake of a vessel the meal offering effects acceptance for the owner, as intent concerning the vessel itself is inconsequential, whereas when one removes the handful for the sake of another meal offering, the meal offering does not fulfill the owner’s obligation. Rabba and Rava did not say as Rav Ashi did in resolving the contradiction because of the difficulty posed by Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, from a case where one removes the handful of a dry meal offering for the sake of a mixed one. Rabbi Shimon holds that such a meal offering fulfills the owner’s obligation even though his intent concerns the meal offering itself, not the vessel.
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara explains why Rabba and Rava reject Rav Ashi’s approach. The dry/mixed case (where Rabbi Shimon is lenient despite offering-type intent) challenges Rav Ashi’s distinction between vessel intent and offering intent.
Segment 20
TYPE: גמרא
Rav Hoshaya’s dilemma: What’s obvious to Rabba and Rava is uncertain to him
Hebrew/Aramaic:
מִילְּתָא דִּפְשִׁיטָא לֵיהּ לְרַבָּה לְהַאי גִּיסָא, וּלְרָבָא לְהַאי גִּיסָא, מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ לְרַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא. דְּבָעֵי רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ: בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא מֵרַבִּי אַסִּי: מִנְחָה לְשׁוּם זֶבַח
English Translation:
The Gemara notes: The matter that is obvious to Rabba in one way, i.e., that with regard to meal offerings recognizably false intention is disregarded, but when the false intention is not recognizable the offering does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, and that is obvious to Rava in the other way, i.e., that in cases of recognizably false intention the offering should not fulfill the owner’s obligation, is a dilemma for Rav Hoshaya. As Rav Hoshaya raises a dilemma, and some say that Rav Hoshaya raises this dilemma before Rav Asi: In the case of one who sacrifices a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering,
What the Gemara is Doing:
The Gemara observes that what Rabba and Rava each consider obvious is actually a genuine dilemma for Rav Hoshaya. He asks Rav Asi: what happens when a meal offering is performed for the sake of an animal sacrifice? The daf ends mid-question, continuing on the next page.